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Abstract
Cryptanalysis and Secure Implementation of Modern
Cryptographic Algorithms
Abdel Alim K. Farag, PhD
Concordia University, 2012
Cryptanalytic attacks can be divided into two classes: pure mathematical attacks and Side Chan-
nel Attacks (SCAs). Pure mathematical attacks are traditional cryptanalytic techniques that rely
on known or chosen input-output pairs of the cryptographic function and exploit the inner struc-
ture of the cipher to reveal the secret key information. On the other hand, in SCAs, it is assumed
that attackers have some access to the cryptographic device and can gain some information from
its physical implementation.
Cold-boot attack is a SCA which exploits the data remanence property of Random Ac-
cess Memory (RAM) to retrieve its content which remains readable shortly after its power has
been removed. Fault analysis is another example of SCAs in which the attacker is assumed to
be able to induce faults in the cryptographic device and observe the faulty output. Then, by
careful inspection of faulty outputs, the attacker recovers the secret information, such as secret
inner state or secret key. Scan-based Design-For-Test (DFT) is a widely deployed technique
for testing hardware chips. Scan-based SCAs exploit the information obtained by analyzing the
scanned data in order to retrieve secret information from cryptographic hardware devices that
are designed with this testability feature.
iii
In the first part of this work, we investigate the use of an off-the-shelf SAT solver, Cryp-
toMinSat, to improve the key recovery of the Advance Encryption Standard (AES-128) key
schedules from its corresponding decayed memory images which can be obtained using cold-
boot attacks.
We also present a fault analysis on both NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign cryptosystems.
For this specific original instantiation of the NTRU encryption system with parameters (N, p, q),
our attack succeeds with probability ≈ 1− 1
p
and when the number of faulted coefficients is up-
per bounded by t, it requires O((pN)t) polynomial inversions in Z/pZ[x]/(xN − 1). We also
investigate several techniques to strengthen hardware implementations of NTRUEncrypt against
this class of attacks. For NTRUSign with parameters (N , q = pl, B, standard, N ), when the
attacker is able to skip the norm-bound signature checking step, our attack needs one fault to
succeed with probability ≈ 1 − 1
p
and requires O((qN)t) steps when the number of faulted
polynomial coefficients is upper bounded by t. The attack is also applicable to NTRUSign uti-
lizing the transposeNTRU lattice but it requires double the number of fault injections. Different
countermeasures against the proposed attack are also investigated.
Furthermore, we present a scan-based SCA on NTRUEncrypt hardware implementations
that employ scan-based DFT techniques. Our attack determines the scan chain structure of the
polynomial multiplication circuits used in the decryption algorithm which allows the cryptana-
lyst to efficiently retrieve the secret key.
Several key agreement schemes based on matrices were recently proposed. For example,
A´lvarez et al. proposed a scheme in which the secret key is obtained by multiplying powers of
block upper triangular matrices whose elements are defined over Zp. Climent et al. identified
the elements of the endomorphisms ring End(Zp ×Zp2) with elements in a set, Ep, of matrices
of size 2 × 2, whose elements in the first row belong to Zp and the elements in the second row
belong to Zp2 . Keith Salvin presented a key exchange protocol using matrices in the general
linear group,GL(r,Zn), where n is the product of two distinct large primes. The system is fully
specified in the US patent number 7346162 issued in 2008. In the second part of this work, we
present mathematical cryptanalytic attacks against these three schemes and show that they can
be easily broken for all practical choices of their security parameters.
iv
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In the academic cryptanalysis literatures, a “break” of a cryptosystem is defined quite
conservatively: if the effort required by the attacker is less than the effort required by naı¨ve
exhaustive search, then the cryptosystem is said to be broken. This conservative definition,
while can be arguably justified, led to many published mathematical attacks that require im-
practical amounts of time, memory, or known/chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs. On the other
hand, in many practical scenarios, the attackers may have access to the cryptographic device. In
such scenarios, SCAs allow the attackers to break these cryptosystems using a relatively small
amount of computational resources and a small number of known/chosen plaintext-ciphertext
pairs.
The basic idea behind SCAs is not new. For example, Wright [190] reported an early
application of acoustic cryptanalysis. During his employment with GCHQ in 1965, the British
intelligence agency (MI5) tried to break a cipher used by the Egyptian embassy in London.
In order to reduce the computational resources required to break the cipher, Wright suggested
placing a spy microphone near the rotor-cipher machine used by the Egyptians to detect the
click-sound produced by the machine. By listening to the clicks of the rotors as cipher clerks
1
reset them each morning, MI5 successfully deduced the core position of some of the machines
rotors which reduced the computation effort needed to break the cipher, and MI5 was able to spy
on the embassys communication for years. Another example is given in a recently declassified
National Security Agency (NSA) document [172] which reveals that in 1943, an engineer with
Bell Telephone observed decipherable spikes on an oscilloscope associated with the decrypted
output of a certain encrypting teletype.
Currently, the wide spread of unprotected software or hardware cryptographic imple-
mentations offers various possibilities for side channel attacks. Such attacks are practical; they
do not even require expensive equipments. For example, Skorobogatov and Anderson [10] car-
ried out fault analysis attacks using a flashgun bought second-hand from a camera store for $30
and with an $8 laser pointer. They also developed relatively simple techniques to set or reset any
individual bit of SRAM in a microcontroller. Thus, unless suitable effective countermeasures
are taken, vulnerability to this class of attacks poses a big problem for the industry, especially
with the wide spread of smart cards, RFIDs, and embedded devices.
In the first part of this thesis, we investigate the application of several SCAs against both
AES [59] and NTRU [84]. In particular, we study the use of an off-the-shelf SAT solver, Cryp-
toMinSat, to improve the key recovery of the AES-128 key schedules from its corresponding
decayed memory images resulting from applying the cold-boot attack. We present a fault analy-
sis on NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign and propose several hardware countermeasures. Proof of
concept FPGA implementations for NTRUEncrypt are also presented. Furthermore, we present
a scan-based SCA on NTRUEncrypt hardware implementations that employ scan-based DFT
techniques.
Public-key cryptography [124] provides key exchange mechanisms in which secret keys
can be exchanged between users over insecure communication channels. These key exchange
mechanisms are usually based on number theory problems such as the discrete logarithm prob-
lem (DLP) [57], integer factorization [158] and elliptic curve DLP [26]. However, such systems
require a large number of arithmetic operations, which makes them hard to implement in most
2
resource constrained applications. To overcome this problem, key exchange protocols based on
efficient matrix algebra have been proposed. For example, A´lvarez et al. [5] proposed a scheme
in which the secret key is obtained by multiplying powers of block upper triangular matrices
whose elements are defined over Zp. Climent et al. [40] identified the elements of the endomor-
phisms ringEnd(Zp×Zp2) with elements in a set, Ep, of matrices of size 2×2, whose elements
in the first row belong to Zp and elements in the second row belong to Zp2 . Keith Salvin [175]
presented a key exchange protocol using matrices in the general linear group, GL(r,Zn), where
n is the product of two distinct large primes. The system is fully specified in the US patent
number 7346162 issued in 2008. In the second part of this work, we present mathematical
cryptanalytic attacks against these three schemes and show that they can be efficiently broken
for all practical choices of their security parameters.
1.2 Thesis contributions
In this thesis, we investigate the application of several side channel attacks on different
ciphers. We also propose some countermeasures against these types of attacks. Some imple-
mentations of theses countermeasures are presented. We also present cryptanalysis of some
recently proposed key exchange schemes. The contribution of this thesis can be summarized as
follows:
1. We investigate the use of an off-the-shelf SAT solver, CryptoMinSat, to improve the key
recovery of the AES-128 key schedules from its corresponding decayed memory images.
By exploiting the asymmetric decay of the memory images and the redundancy of key
material inherent in the AES key schedule, rectifying the faults in the corrupted memory
images of the AES-128 key schedule is formulated as a Boolean satisfiability problem
which can be solved efficiently for relatively large decay factors. Our experimental results
show that this approach improves upon the previously known results.
2. We present a fault analysis attack on NTRUEncrypt. The fault model in which we analyze
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the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a small number of
coefficients of the polynomial input to (or output from) the second step of the decryption
process but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. For this specific orig-
inal instantiation of the NTRU encryption system with parameters (N, p, q), our attack
succeeds with probability ≈ 1 − 1
p
and when the number of faulted coefficients is upper
bounded by t, it requires O((pN)t) polynomial inversions in Z/pZ[x]/(xN − 1). We also
investigate several techniques to strengthen hardware implementations of NTRUEncrypt
against this class of attacks. In particular, by utilizing the algebraic structure of the ci-
pher, we propose several countermeasures based on error detection checksum codes, and
spatial/temporal redundancies. The error detection capabilities of these countermeasures,
as well as their impact on the decryption throughput and area, are also presented.
3. We present a fault analysis attack on NTRUSign. The utilized fault model is the one
in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a small number of coefficients in a
specific polynomial during the signing process but cannot control the exact location of
the injected transient faults. For NTRUsign with parameters (N , q = pl, B, standard,N ),
when the attacker is able to skip the norm-bound signature checking step, our attack needs
one fault, succeeds with probability ≈ 1 − 1
p
and requires O((qN)t) computation steps
when the number of faulted polynomial coefficients is upper bounded by t. The attack is
also applicable to NTRUSign utilizing the transpose NTRU lattice but it requires double
the number of fault injections. Different countermeasures against the proposed attack are
investigated.
4. We present a scan-based SCA on NTRUEncrypt hardware implementations that employ
scan-based Design-For-Test (DFT) techniques. Our attack determines the scan chain
structure of the polynomial multiplication circuits used in the decryption algorithm which
allows the cryptanalyst to efficiently retrieve the secret key.
5. We show that breaking the key exchange scheme proposed by A´lvarez et al. [8] with
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security parameters (r, s, p) is equivalent to solving a set of 3(r + s)2 linear equations
with 2(r + s)2 unknowns in Zp, which renders this system insecure for all the suggested
practical choices of the security parameters.
6. Climent et al. [40] identified the elements of the endomorphisms ring End(Zp × Zp2)
with elements in a set, Ep, of matrices of size 2 × 2, whose elements in the first row
belong to Zp and the elements in the second row belong to Zp2 . By taking advantage
of matrix arithmetic, they proposed a key exchange protocol using polynomial functions
over Ep defined by polynomials in Z[X]. We show that this key exchange protocol is
insecure; it can be broken by solving a set of 10 consistent homogeneous linear equations
in 8 unknowns over Zp2 .
7. Keith Salvin [175] presented a key exchange protocol using matrices in the general linear
group,GL(r,Zn), where n is the product of two distinct large primes. The system is fully
specified in the US patent number 7346162 issued in 2008. In the patent claims, it is
argued that the best way to break this system is to factor n. Furthermore, for efficiency
reasons, it is suggested to use r = 2. We show that this cryptosystem can be easily broken
by solving a set of consistent homogeneous r2 linear equations in 2r unknowns over Zn.
The contributions made throughout this work have been published in [99–109].
1.3 Outline of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we provide a brief overview
of side channel attacks. A classification of these attacks, examples, and proposed countermea-
sures are also presented. We also briefly review the Boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem. In
chapter 3, we show how to use an off-the-shelf SAT solver, CryptoMinSat, to improve the key
recovery of the AES-128 key schedules from its corresponding decayed memory images. Chap-
ter 4 presents our fault analysis attacks against NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign cryptosystems.
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Different countermeasures are also presented. In chapter 5, we describe our proposed scan-
based side channel attack on the NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem. The simulation results and their
analysis are also provided. Chapter 6 provides cryptanalysis of the three key exchange schemes
proposed by A´lvarez et al. [8], Climent et al. [40], and Keith Salvin [175]. Our conclusions
and some suggestions for future research directions are given in chapter 7. An architecture that
offers different area-speed trade-off for NTRUEncrypt is presented in Appendix A together with
a proof of concept FPGA implementation results. Results on implementing NTRUEncrypt on
the NVIDIA GTX275 GPU, using the CUDA framework are presented in Appendix B.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The classical focus of cryptography has been communication security. Consequently,
traditional cryptanalytic techniques focused on information flowing over the communication
channel rather than the endpoint cryptographic devices. This view has changed dramatically
with the introduction of SCAs in the open literatures. Cryptography is now widely deployed in
many devices ranging from pay TV units, cell phones, prepaid cards and smart cards. Because
these cryptographic devices are easily obtainable, attackers can study the internal structure of
the hardware to learn specific details about their implementations. Knowledge of the imple-
mentation may then be used to carry out attacks on the system without directly attacking the
mathematics of the algorithms. In other words, even when totally secure algorithms and proto-
cols are employed, attackers might still be able to learn valuable secret information due to the
specific software or hardware implementation of the system. Figure 2.1 shows a modern view
of the cryptographic model including different side channel information that can be obtained
from the endpoint devices.
In this chapter we provide a brief overview of side channel attacks. A classification of
SCAs is given in the next section. Examples of these attacks and proposed countermeasures
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are presented in section 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Finally, in section 2.5 we briefly review the














Figure 2.1: The cryptographic model including examples for side-channels
2.2 Classifications of side channel attacks
SCAs can be classified according to (i) the attackers capabilities to control the compu-
tation process, (ii) the way of accessing the cryptographic module and (iii) the method used in
the analysis process [196].
2.2.1 Controls over the computation process
SCAs can be divided based on the control over the computation process by attackers into
two main categories: passive attacks and active attacks. Passive attacks refer to those that do not
interfere with the operation of the target system, i.e., the attacker is assumed to be able to collect
some information about the operation of the target system without disturbing its behavior. In
contrast, in active attacks, the adversary can affect the behavior of the target system, while the
attacked system may or may not be able to detect such influence.
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2.2.2 Ways of accessing the module
Anderson et al. [10] classified side channel attacks into three classes: invasive attacks,
semi-invasive attacks and non-invasive attacks.
A. Invasive attacks
Invasive attacks require a direct physical access to the internal components of the crypto-
graphic modules. A classic example of this class of attacks is when attackers may get access
to the inner layer of the cryptographic module and place a probing needle on the data bus
to record and later analyze the data transferred. Several defensive measures are usually
implemented in hardware to counter such invasive attacks effectively. For example, some
cryptographic modules with higher security level reset all their memories when tampering
is detected [60].
B. Semi-invasive attacks
The notion of semi-invasive attack was first introduced by Skorobogatov and Anderson
[174]. This type of attacks involves access to the device, but without physical access or
damage to the layer that contains the cryptographic module. For example, in fault-induced
attacks, the attacker may use a laser beam to ionize the device in order to change some of its
memory contents and consequently change the output of the device.
C. Non-invasive attacks
Non-invasive attacks require close examination or manipulation of the device’s behavior.
This class of attacks exploits information that is unintentionally leaked. A classical example
of such attacks is timing analysis which measures the time consumed by a device to perform
an operation and analyze it to deduce the secret keys. One of the main characteristics of
a non-invasive attack is that it is completely undetectable. For example, a tamper resistant
smart card cannot figure out that its running time is currently being measured. Furthermore,
contrary to invasive attacks that require individual processing of each attacked device, non-
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invasive attacks are often low-cost to deploy on a large scale. Therefore, non-invasive attacks
present more threat for embedded devices and smart cards.
2.2.3 Methods used in the analysis process
Based on the methods used in the analysis process of the sampled data, SCA attacks
are divided into Simple Side Channel Attack (SSCA) and Differential Side Channel Attack
(DSCA). SSCA exploits the side channel output primarily depending on the performed opera-
tions. Typically, a single trace is used in an SSCA analysis, and therefore the secret key can
be directly read from the side channel trace. If the SSCA is not successful due to noise in the
measurements, DSCA can be used. DSCA exploits the correlation between the processed data
and the side channel output. Since this correlation is often very small, statistical methods are
used to exploit it efficiently.
2.3 Examples of side channel attacks
Side channel attacks exploit the information leaked by the physical characteristics of
the cryptographic modules during execution of the algorithm. This extra information can be
extracted from timing, power consumption or electromagnetic radiation characteristics. Other
forms of side channel information can also be available as a result of hardware or software
failures, changes in frequency or temperature, and computational errors.
2.3.1 Timing attack
The majority of optimized implementations of cryptographic algorithms execute the
computations in a non-constant time. If these operations involve secret parameters, these timing
variations can leak some information that can provide enough knowledge of the implementa-
tion. A careful statistical analysis sometimes could even lead to the total recovery of the secret
parameters. Timing attacks were first introduced in 1996 by Kocher [115] who demonstrated
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the feasibility of these attacks against the RSA system. Later, Schindler [160] presented timing
attacks on implementations of RSA exponentiation that employ the Chinese Remainder Theo-
rem (CRT). Afterwards, several experimental results on various cryptographic algorithms have
been reported (e.g., [52, 78]).
In order to illustrate the idea of the timing attack, consider an RSA cryptosystem where
the encryption operation involves the computation of R = yx mod n where n is the public
modulus, and y is the message being encrypted. The goal of the attacker is to find the secret key
x.
Algorithm 1 shows the modular exponentiation algorithm which is typically used to com-
putesR = yx mod n, where x isw bits long. Kocher [115] shows that an attacker who can record
the message received and the time taken to respond to each y, will be able to predict the op-
erations of the algorithm. In particular, the timing attack described by Kocher allows someone
who knows the exponent bits 0 · · · (b− 1) to find bit b. This is because when the first b bits are
known, the attacker can compute the first b iterations of the for loop to find the value of sb. In
the next iteration, the first unknown bit will be tested. If it is set, Rb = (sb · y) mod n will be
computed, else this operation will be skipped. If the total modular exponentiation time for the
iteration is ever fast when Rb = (sb · y) mod n is slow then bit b must be zero. Conversely,
if the modular exponentiation time is slow, then the bit must be set. The same set of timing
measurement can be used to determine the rest of the exponentiation bits.
Algorithm 1Modular Exponentiation Algorithm [115]
1: Let s0 = 1.
2: for k = 0 to w − 1 do
3: if (bit k of x is 1) then
4: Let Rk = (sk · y) mod n
5: else
6: Let Rk = sk
7: end if





A special class of timing attacks is cache based attacks which involve monitoring the
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movement of data into and out of the cache. Cache profiles can be used to recover the secret
key information of a cryptographic algorithm. Such attacks usually consist of a collection phase
that provides the attacker with profiles of execution, and an analysis phase which recovers the
secret information. Cache based attacks can be categorized as trace driven attacks [152] or time
driven attacks [185, 186]. Trace driven attacks rely on the ability of the attacker to capture a
profile of cache activity that results from running the algorithm. That is, in order to perform a
successful attack, the adversary needs a cache trace which shows cache hits or misses for every
memory access. Time driven attacks rely on the fact that the execution time is mainly affected
by memory accesses since cache hits result in a lower execution time and cache misses result in
a comparably higher execution time.
2.3.2 Fault attacks
If the attacker is able to induce a fault or error during the operation of the cryptographic
module, then the faulty behavior may provide the attacker with valuable side channel infor-
mation that can greatly increase the cipher’s vulnerability to cryptanalysis. Fault cryptanalysis
presents practical and effective attacks against cryptographic hardware devices such as smart
cards. The threat posed by these attacks was first demonstrated in the open literatures by Boneh
et al. [29, 30] who showed that it is easy to extract the private RSA decryption/signing keys by
inducing errors in the CRT implementation and observing the faulty output. Since then, many
cryptographic algorithms have been broken by using such types of attacks. In [25], Biham and
Shamir presented fault analysis attacks on the DES symmetric-key encryption scheme. Shamir
et al. [79] developed general fault analysis techniques which can be used to attack the standard
constructions of stream ciphers based on LFSRs.
A special type of fault analysis can be performed when the adversary is able to manipu-
late the program counter to skip instructions of an algorithm. In these fault models, we assume
that the fault injection allows the attacker to skip the targeted instruction with a specific proba-
bility, i.e., we assume that the fault injection may also cause other instructions to be skipped or
12
other variables to be changed randomly. Thus, an adversary must be able to check, whether the
fault injection was successful or not. In practice, these fault attacks can be launched by intro-
ducing power glitch or spikes or by clocking the module with a clock rate outside the allowed
range. Various experimental results confirming the above ideas were verified (e.g., [161]).
2.3.3 Power analysis attacks
In addition to the computation time and the faulty behavior, the power consumption of
a cryptographic device can also leak useful information about the running operations and their
involved secret parameters. Unlike the timing and the fault analysis, power analysis attacks
are applicable only to hardware implementations. These attacks proved to be very effective in
attacking smart cards and other embedded systems. Generally, power analysis attacks can be
categorized into Simple and Differential Power Analysis (referred to as SPA and DPA, respec-
tively). In SPA attacks, the goal is utilize the measured power traces in order to guess which
particular instruction is being carried out at a specific time as well as the input and output values
of this instruction. For that, the adversary needs to know the exact structure of the implemen-
tation in order to apply such an attack. In contrast, DPA attacks do not require knowledge of
the implementation details and instead exploit statistical methods in the analysis process. In
general, DPA is one of the most powerful SCAs which can be applied using relatively little
resources [116, 150]. Experimental results with power analysis attacks on smart cards were
reported in [3, 62, 126].
2.3.4 Electromagnetic attacks
Similar to any electrical device, the components of cryptographic devices usually gen-
erate electromagnetic radiations as part of their execution processes. By analyzing these em-
anations, the attacker can deduce the relationship between it and the underlying computation
and data. This may allow the attacker to extract some useful information about the secret pa-
rameters of the cryptographic algorithm. Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) can also be divided
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into two main classes: simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) and Differential Electromag-
netic Analysis (DEMA). Experimental results on electromagnetic analysis attacks on crypto-
graphic devices such as smart cards and comparisons to power analysis attacks were presented
in [61, 156].
2.3.5 Cold-boot attacks
A cold-boot attack [72] is a SCA that exploits the fact that data loss of a non-powered
random access memory can be retarded by cooling it down. In 2002, Skorobogatov [173] per-
formed experiments to study the temperature dependency of data retention time in static RAM
devices. The reported experimental results indicate that many chips may preserve data for rela-
tively long periods of time at temperatures above −20◦C which contradicted the common wis-
dom that was widely believed at that time. The temperature at which 80% of the data remained
for one minute varied widely between devices. While some devices required cooling to at least
−50◦C, others, surprisingly, retained data for this period at room temperature. Memory re-
tention time also varied between devices of the same type from the same manufacturer, most
likely, because controlling data retention time is not a part of the chip manufacturing quality
process [173].
Thus, one way to launch a cold-boot attack is to remove the memory module, after
cooling it, from the target system and immediately plugging it in another system under the
adversary’s control. This system is then booted to access the memory. Another possible ap-
proach to execute the attack is to cold-boot the target machine by cycling its power OFF and
then ON without letting it shut down properly. Then a lightweight operating system is instantly
booted where the content of targeted memory is dumped to a file. Further analysis can then
be performed against the information that is retrieved from memory in order to find sensitive
information such as cryptographic keys or passwords.
14
2.3.6 Scan-based attacks
Scan-based Design-for-Test [34] is a widely deployed technique for testing hardware
chips. Using this approach, all flip-flops in the design under test are connected to a scan chain
where their states can be scanned out during the testing phase. Scan-based SCAs exploit the
information obtained by analyzing the scanned data in order to retrieve secret information from
cryptographic hardware devices that are designed with this testability feature.
While scan-based DFT improves the quality of testing, it also opens a powerful side
channel against hardware implementations of cryptographic devices that utilize this technique.
Despite the fact that the internal structure of the scan chain is usually not known to attackers,
exploiting the information obtained from analyzing the scanned data allows cryptanalysts to
ascertain this structure and retrieve the secret key information from cryptographic hardware
devices implementing various cryptographic algorithms
2.3.7 Acoustic attacks
Most research on side channel attack focused on timing, power consumption, and fault
features. However, one of the oldest eavesdropping methods, namely acoustic emanations, has
received little attention. Recently, Shamir et al. [166] have presented introductory proof-of-
concept that confirm the correlation between the sound of a PC and its computation. Although
we may consider the technique used by P. Wright in 1965 as one of the primitive acoustic
attacks [190], this is a relatively new field of research, and much research is needed to confirm
its effectiveness against modern cryptographic algorithms and devices.
2.4 Countermeasures against side channel attacks
SCAs primarily focus on the implementation of the cryptographic algorithm. Several
software and hardware countermeasures were proposed to combat side channel attacks. Some
of these countermeasures make algorithmic changes to the cryptographic primitives so that at-
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tacks are provably inefficient on the obtained implementation. Other countermeasures decor-
relate the output traces on individual runs. In what follows, we briefly explain how specific
countermeasure can be applied in order to thwart different forms of SCAs.
2.4.1 Preventing timing attacks
The most obvious way to prevent timing attacks is to force all operations to consume
the same amount of time. When this is not possible, another approach is to make timing mea-
surements extremely inaccurate, e.g., by introducing random timing shifts and wait states, or
by inserting dummy instructions. Random delays added to the processing time do increase the
number of ciphertexts required by the cryptanalyst, but attackers can compensate for this by col-
lecting more measurements. The number of samples required increases roughly as the square of
the timing noise [115]. In [115], Kocher describes a methodology for preventing timing attack
based on the techniques used for blinding signature. His approach is to choose a random pair




i mod n. Before the modular exponentiation operation, the input
message should be multiplied with vf mod n, and afterwards the result is corrected by again
multiplying it with vf mod n. The (vi, vf ) pair should not be reused since they themselves
might be compromised by timing attacks. An efficient solution to this problem is to update vi
and vf before each modular exponentiation step. If (vi, vf ) is secret, then the attacker has no
useful knowledge about the input to the modular exponentiation.
Wang et al. [188] propose two approaches to overcome cache based SCAs. The first
approach is to use a partition based approach to eliminate cache interference. The second is
based on randomizing cache interference in such a way to guarantee zero information leakage.
The authors have also presented a new security aware cache design which consists of Partition
Locked cache (PLcache) and Random Permutation cache (RPcache).
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2.4.2 Preventing power analysis attacks
Mitigation power analysis attacks can be achieved by modifying the design of the hard-
ware device in such away that its power consumption becomes random or to make the device
consume an equal amount of power for all operations and for all processed data values. The data
masking technique, which can be introduced at the software or hardware level, is another widely
used countermeasure against power analysis attacks [38, 70]. The basic idea of most masking
approaches is to randomize the intermediate values that are processed in the computation of the
algorithm operation. In case of AES, the SubByte operation is the only nonlinear operation in
the AES algorithm. This operation consists of two sub-operations: the inverse operation and
the affine operation. Hence, one should focus on the masking of the inverse operation [148].
The idea of masking the inverse operation is to input the value A⊕M to the algorithm in such
a way that we obtain the output value A−1 ⊕M , where A is the intermediate data, and M is
the mask. There are two types of masking: multiplicative masking and additive masking (e.g.,
see [4, 69, 150, 182, 195]). Techniques to mitigate higher order power analysis are investigated
in e.g., [63, 71, 94, 112, 155, 157, 162].
2.4.3 Preventing fault attacks
Given the relative ease of injecting faults into cryptographic devices, proper counter-
measures must be taken in order to keep theses devices secure. Typically, such countermeasures
aim to detect any transient or permanent faults that occur in the cryptosystem and immediately
suppress the resulting faulted outputs or reset all the output bits to zeros (or any other arbitrary
value) in order to prevent the attacker from observing the output of faulty devices and hence mit-
igate the susceptibility of the system to these attacks. Numerous approaches to fault detection
techniques for ciphers have been proposed. These approaches can be divided into two classes:
Error Detecting Codes (EDCs) and Redundancy-Based Techniques (RBT) [20, 117].
2.4.4 Preventing cold-boot attacks
As mentioned above, cold-boot attacks exploit DRAM remanence to acquire memory
images from which keys and other sensitive data can be extracted. In order to mitigate the threat
of this attack, one should apply some transformations to the key as it is stored in memory in order
to make it more difficult to reconstruct in the case of errors [35]. One should also prevent keys
from being paged to disks by clearing memory at boot time. Other suggested countermeasures
include: (i) physically protecting the memory. For example, DRAM modules could be locked
in place inside the machine, (ii) suspending the system safely by powering off the machine
completely when it is not in use, (iii) encrypting in the disk controller. This approach differs
from typical disk encryption systems in that encryption and decryption are done by the disk
controller rather than by software in the main CPU, and that the main encryption keys are
stored in the disk controller rather than in DRAM. One example for AES implementations that
is secure against this class of attacks is Tresor [136] which is a kernel patch for Linux based
operating systems which loads and manipulates key related data directly in the microprocessor
and its registers.
2.5 The SAT problem
The Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) problem [44] is defined as follows: given a Boolean
formula, check whether an assignment of Boolean values to the propositional variables in the
formula exists such that the formula evaluates to true. If such an assignment exists, the formula
is said to be satisfiable; otherwise, it is unsatisfiable. For a formula with m variables, there
are 2m possible assignments. The Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) is the most frequently
used form for representing Boolean formulas. In CNF, the variables of the formula appear in
literals (e.g., x) or their negation (e.g., x). Literals are grouped into clauses, which represent a
disjunction (logical OR) of the literals they contain. A single literal can appear in any number
of clauses. The conjunction (logical AND) of all clauses represents a formula. For example,
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the CNF formula (x1) ∧ (x2 ∨ x3) ∧ (x1 ∨ x3) contains three clauses: x1, x2 ∨ x3 and x1 ∨ x3.
Two literals in these clauses are positive (x1, x3) and two are negative (x2, x3). For a variable
assignment to satisfy a CNF formula, it must satisfy each of its clauses. For example, if x1 is
true and x2 is false, then all three clauses are satisfied, regardless of the value of x3.
Given a set of equations of a system which we want solve, the higher degree are handled
by noting that, for example, the logical expression
(x1 ∨ T )(x2 ∨ T )(x3 ∨ T )(x4 ∨ T )(T ∨ x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4) (2.1)
is tautologically equivalent to T ⇔ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4), or the GF (2) equation T =
x1x2x3x4. Similar expressions exist for higher order terms. Thus, the system of equations
obtained in this step can be linearlized by introducing new variables.
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Chapter 3
Applications of SAT Solvers to AES Key
Recovery from Decayed Key Schedule
Images
3.1 Introduction
A cold-boot attack [72] is a SCA that exploits the fact that data loss of a non-powered
RAM can be deployed by cooling it down. In 2002, Skorobogatov [173] performed experiments
to study the temperature dependency of data retention time in static RAM devices. The reported
results indicated that many chips may preserve data for relatively long periods of time at temper-
atures above −20◦C which contradicted the common wisdom that was widely believed at that
time. The temperature at which 80% of the data remained for one minute varied widely between
devices. While some devices required cooling to at least −50◦C, others, surprisingly, retained
data for this period at room temperature. Memory retention time also varied between devices of
the same type from the same manufacturer, most likely, because controlling data retention time
is not a part of the chip manufacturing quality process.
Thus, one way to launch a cold-boot attack is to remove the memory module, after cool-
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ing it, from the target system and immediately plug it in another system under the adversary’s
control. This system is then booted to access the memory. Another possible approach to execute
the attack is to cold-boot the target machine by cycling its power OFF and then ON without let-
ting it shut down properly. Then a lightweight operating system is, instantly, booted where the
content of targeted memory is dumped to a file. Further analysis can then be performed against
the information that is retrieved from memory in order to find sensitive information such as
cryptographic keys or passwords.
Because of the nature of cold-boot attacks, it is realistic to assume that only a corrupted
image of the contents of memory will be available to the attacker, i.e., a fraction of the memory
bits will be flipped. Halderman et al. [72] observed that, within a specific memory region, the
decay is overwhelmingly asymmetric, i.e., either 0→ 1 or 1→ 0. When trying to retrieve cryp-
tographic keys, the decay direction for a region can be determined by comparing the number of
0s and 1s since, in an uncorrupted key, the expected number of 0s and 1s should approximately
be equal.
Given this asymmetric decay, rectifying these faults can be achieved by further exploiting
the redundancy of key material inherent in many widely used cryptographic algorithms. For
example, in [75], Heninger et al. showed that an RSA private key with small public exponent
can be efficiently recovered given a 0.27 fraction of its bits at random. In [72], Halderman et
al. have developed a recovery algorithm for the 128-bit version of the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES-128) that recovers keys from 30% decayed AES-128 Key Schedule images in
less than 20 minutes about half the time. Tsow [184] further improved upon this proof of
concept and presented a heuristic algorithm that solved all cases at 50% decay or less in under
half a second. At 60% decay, Tsow recovered the worst case in 35.500 seconds while solving
the average case in 0.174 seconds. At the extended decay rate of 70%, recovery time averages
grew to over 6 minutes with the median time at about five seconds. Nearly half of the 17.4 day
run was consumed by solving the worst case of the test suite; the second slowest case was over
six times faster.
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It should be noted, however, that the algorithm developed by Tsow is complex and is cer-
tainly uneasy to develop and fine tune. On the other hand, the relations that have to be satisfied
between the different subround key bits in the AES key schedule can be easily formulated as a
Boolean SAT problem which lends itself naturally to SAT solvers. In this chapter, we explore
the use of CryptoMiniSAT SAT solver [176] on the above problem, i.e., to recover AES-128
keys from its decayed key schedule images.
3.2 The SAT problem and its applications to cryptanalysis
While the SAT problem is NP-complete [44], efficient heuristics exist that can solve
many real-life SAT formulations. Furthermore, the wide range of target applications of SAT
have motivated advances in SAT solving techniques that have been incorporated into freely-
available SAT software tools (e.g., [18, 55, 67, 77, 132]. Also see the international SAT compe-
titions web page [19].)
Given the versatility and effectiveness of SAT solving techniques, the use of SAT solvers
in cryptanalysis has recently attracted the attention of many cryptanalysts. In the area of crypt-
analysis of block ciphers, Courtois et al. [46] presented an attack on the KeeLoq block cipher.
They showed that when about 232 known plaintexts are available, KeeLoq becomes very week
and for 30% of all keys, the full key can be recovered with complexity of 228 KeeLoq encryp-
tions. Erickson et al. [58] used the Gro¨bner basis attacks [32] on SMS4 equation system over
GF(2) and GF(28) and used the SAT solver over the GF(2) model. They implement their design
in Gro¨bner basis using a Magma tool and in SAT solver using the MiniSAT tool. In [45], 6
rounds of DES are attacked with only a single plaintext-ciphertext pair.
SAT solvers have also been applied to the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. Eibach et
al. [56] presented experimental results over a slightly modified version of Trivium (Bivium)
using a SAT solver, an exhaustive search, a BDD based attack, a graph theoretic approach, and
Gro¨bner basis. The results indicate that the initial state of the cipher is recovered and the use of
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SAT solver is faster than the other attacks. The full key of Hitage2 stream cipher is recovered
in a few hours when using MiniSat 2.0 [47]. In [48], the full 48-bit key of the MiFare Crypto-1
algorithm was recovered in 200 seconds on a PC, given one known Initialization Vector (IV)
(from one single encryption).
Mironov and Zhang [129] described some initial results on using SAT solvers to auto-
mate certain components in cryptanalysis of hash functions of the MD and SHA families. They
generated full collisions for MD4 andMD5. De et al. [51] presented heuristics for solving inver-
sion problems for functions that satisfy certain statistical properties similar to those of random
functions. They demonstrate that this technique can be used to solve the hard case of inverting a
popular secure hash function and inverted MD4 up to 2 rounds and 7 steps in less than 8 hours.
In this work, we use the CryptoMiniSat [176], which is an extension of MinSat (a state-
of-the-art DPLL-based [50] SAT solver), refined to understand the XOR operation, which is
common in cryptography, besides functions in CNF that is native to many SAT solvers.
3.3 Structure of the AES-128 key schedule
In this section, we briefly review the relevant details of the AES-128 key schedule [49,
59]. Bytes of initial key are denoted by K0i,j , where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3 stand for the row index and
column index, respectively in the standard AES state matrix representation. Figure 3.1 shows
the AES-128 key schedule.
These 16 initial key bytes are bijectively mapped to 10 additional round-keys denoted by
Kr+1i,j , where 0 ≤ r ≤ 9 stands for the number of the subkeys (rounds). The r
th key schedule




























































































































Figure 3.1: The key schedule of the AES-128
where Rcon(·) is a round-dependent constant and S(·) denotes the s-box (SubBytes)
operation which is performed, on each byte of the state, by first taking the multiplicative inverse
in GF (28) using the irreducible polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 and then applying an affine
transformation over GF (2) .
Similar to any Boolean function, each one of the eight coordinate of the s-box, Sl, l =
1, · · · , 8, has a unique representation as a polynomial overGF (2), called the Algebraic Normal
Form (ANF) which is obtained by summing up distinct products terms of x1, x2, . . . , xn, and
can be written as










a123...nx1x2 . . . xn,
where a0, ai, . . . , a123...n ∈ GF (2).
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3.4 Formulating the AES key schedule as a SAT problem
The AES key-schedule, described in the previous section, is the primary source of redun-
dancy utilized to rectify faults in the corrupted memory images of the AES-128 key schedule.
The conversion from the key schedule to the Boolean SAT problem proceeds as follows.
First, the system of equations of the AES-128 key schedule are generated according to
the pseudocode in Equation (3.1). In each round, the s-box equations in lines 1, 2 of Equation
(3.1) are represented in their ANF (e.g., Figure 3.2 shows the ANF of the first coordinate func-
tion of the s-box). Then, the terms of quadratic and higher degrees are handled by using the
formula in (2.1).
S1 = x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x1x7 ⊕ x1x8 ⊕ x2x4 ⊕ x2x6 ⊕ x2x8 ⊕ x3x5 ⊕ x4x6 ⊕ x6x7
⊕x6x8 ⊕ x1x2x4 ⊕ x1x2x6 ⊕ x1x2x8 ⊕ x1x3x4 ⊕ x1x3x5 ⊕ x1x4x7 ⊕ x1x5x8 ⊕ x1x6x8⊕
x2x3x4 ⊕ x2x3x6 ⊕ x2x3x8 ⊕ x2x4x6 ⊕ x2x5x7 ⊕ x2x5x8 ⊕ x2x6x7 ⊕ x2x7x8 ⊕ x3x4x5⊕
x3x4x8 ⊕ x3x5x6 ⊕ x3x5x7 ⊕ x3x5x8 ⊕ x3x6x8 ⊕ x3x7x8 ⊕ x4x7x8 ⊕ x5x6x7 ⊕ x5x6x8⊕
x1x2x3x4 ⊕ x1x2x3x6 ⊕ x1x2x3x7 ⊕ x1x2x4x6 ⊕ x1x2x4x7 ⊕ x1x2x4x8 ⊕ x1x2x5x7⊕
x1x2x5x8 ⊕ x1x3x4x7 ⊕ x1x3x5x8 ⊕ x1x4x5x6 ⊕ x1x4x5x7 ⊕ x1x4x5x8 ⊕ x1x4x6x8⊕
x1x4x7x8 ⊕ x1x5x6x7 ⊕ x1x5x6x8 ⊕ x1x6x7x8 ⊕ x2x3x4x5 ⊕ x2x3x5x8 ⊕ x2x4x5x8⊕
x2x4x6x7 ⊕ x2x4x6x8 ⊕ x2x5x6x8 ⊕ x2x5x7x8 ⊕ x3x4x6x7 ⊕ x3x5x6x7 ⊕ x3x5x6x8⊕
x3x6x7x8 ⊕ x4x5x6x7 ⊕ x4x5x7x8 ⊕ x4x6x7x8 ⊕ x5x6x7x8 ⊕ x1x2x3x4x5 ⊕ x1x2x3x4x7⊕
x1x2x3x5x7 ⊕ x1x2x3x5x8 ⊕ x1x2x3x6x7 ⊕ x1x2x3x7x8 ⊕ x1x2x4x5x8 ⊕ x1x2x4x6x7⊕
x1x2x6x7x8 ⊕ x1x3x4x7x8 ⊕ x1x3x6x7x8 ⊕ x1x4x5x6x8 ⊕ x1x4x5x7x8 ⊕ x2x3x4x5x6⊕
x2x3x4x5x8 ⊕ x2x3x4x6x7 ⊕ x2x3x4x7x8 ⊕ x2x3x5x6x7 ⊕ x2x4x5x6x8 ⊕ x2x4x6x7x8⊕
x2x5x6x7x8 ⊕ x3x4x5x6x8 ⊕ x3x4x5x7x8 ⊕ x4x5x6x7x8 ⊕ x1x2x3x4x5x7 ⊕ x1x2x3x4x6x8
⊕x1x2x3x5x6x8 ⊕ x1x2x3x5x7x8 ⊕ x1x2x4x5x6x8 ⊕ x1x2x4x5x7x8 ⊕ x1x2x5x6x7x8⊕
x1x3x4x5x6x8 ⊕ x1x3x4x5x7x8 ⊕ x1x3x4x6x7x8 ⊕ x2x3x4x5x6x8 ⊕ x1x2x3x4x5x6x8⊕
x1x2x3x4x5x7x8
Figure 3.2: Algebraic normal form of the first coordinate function of the AES s-box
Thus, the system of equations obtained in this step can be linearlized by introducing new
variables as illustrated by the following toy example.
Example 3.1 Suppose we would like to find the Boolean variable assignment that satisfies the
following formula
x0 ⊕ x1x2 ⊕ x0x1x2 = 0
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Using the approach illustrated in (2.1), we introduce two linearization variables, T0 =
x1x2 and T1 = x0x1x2. Thus we have
x0 ⊕ T0 ⊕ T1 = 0,
(T 0 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 0 ∨ x2) ∧ (T0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1,
(T 1 ∨ x0) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x2)∧
(T1 ∨ x0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1.
(3.2)
Since the CryptoMinSAT expects only positive clauses and the CNF form does not have
any constants, we need to overcome the problem that the first line in Equation (3.2) corresponds
to a negative, i.e., false, clause. Adding the clause consisting of a dummy variable, d, or equiv-
alently (d ∧ d · · · ∧ d) would require the variable d to be true in any satisfying solution, since
all clauses must be true in any satisfying solution. In other words, the variable d will serve the
place of the constant 1. Therefore, the above formula can be reexpressed as
d = 1,
x0 ⊕ T0 ⊕ T1 ⊕ d = 1,
(T 0 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 0 ∨ x2) ∧ (T0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1,
(T 1 ∨ x0) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x1) ∧ (T 1 ∨ x2)∧
(T1 ∨ x0 ∨ x1 ∨ x2) = 1.
Table 3.1 shows the CryptoMiniSat input corresponding to Example 3.1.
In our AES-128 key schedule system, each s-box can be represented by 8 XOR equa-
tions corresponding to its 8 Boolean coordinates; and 246 CNF equations corresponding to 246
linearization variables. The total number of clauses corresponding to these CNF equations is
equal to 1254. Since, each round in the AES-128 key schedule involves four s-box look-up op-
erations and 96 linear XOR equations (line 3 in Equation (3.1)), then the total number of clauses
(including XOR clauses) in each round is equal to 4 × (1254 + 8) + 96 = 5144. Thus, for the
complete 10 rounds key schedule, we have 10×5144 clauses+1 dummy variable to present the
26
Table 3.1: CryptoMinSAT input corresponding to Example 3.1
c Lines starting with ‘c’ are comments
c The first line in the SAT file is in the form:
c ‘p cnf # variables # clauses’
c Each line should end with ‘0’
c Lines starting with ‘x’ denote XOR equations
c True variables are denoted by numbers
c False variables are denoted by negating these numbers
c In this example, d→ 1, x0 → 2 (consequently x0 → −2)
c x1 → 3, x2 → 4, T0 → 5, T1 → 6
p cnf 6 9
1 0
x 2 5 6 1 0
-5 3 0
-5 4 0




6 -2 -3 -4 0
constant 1.
3.5 Experimental results
Similar to the previous work in [72,184], throughout our experimental results, we assume
an asymmetric decay model where bits overwhelmingly decay to their ground state rather than
their charged state. Using this model, only the bits that remain in their charged state will be
useful to the cryptanalyst since one cannot be sure about the original values of the 0 bits, i.e.,
whether they were originally 0s or decayed 1s. Let β denote the fraction of decayed bits. If the
percentage of 0s and 1s in the original key schedule bits is pz and 1− pz, respectively, then the
fraction, f , of key bits that can be assumed to be known by examining the decayed memory of
the AES key schedule is given by
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f = 1− (pz + β × (1− pz)) = (1− pz)× (1− β).
Since in an uncorrupted AES key schedule, we expect the number of 0s and 1s to be
approximately equal, i.e., pz ≈ 1/2, then we have f ≈ (1− β)/2.
Table 3.2 shows a comparison between our work and the results reported in [184] which
recover the AES-128 key schedule from its decayed memory images for a decay factor up to
70%. In this table, for our work, all statistics were generated using 10,000 runs for each decay
factor.
It should be noted that the performance in [184] was evaluated on Dell Precision Work-
station 7400 running a 3.4 GHz quad-core Xeon processor with 4 GB of RAM. The performance
of our approach was evaluated on a slightly less powerful machine: Dell Precision 370 Work-
station running a 3.0 GHz Intel Pentium 4 CPU with 1 GB of RAM.
While the algorithm in [184] runs slightly faster for small values of β ≤ 50%, it is
clear that our proposed SAT approach outperforms the algorithm in [184] for large values of
β. In [184] with decay factor 70%, the recovery time for the worst case was more than 8.5
days. The average time was 5 minutes and median time was about 5 seconds. In our work,
the worst case for the recovery time was obtained in less than 3.5 minutes and 7968 cases were
recovered in less than one second. The average and median recovery times are 1.2, 0.36 seconds
respectively. It should also be noted that for small values of β, the difference in the run time
statistics between the two approaches is practically not very significant because the run time is
usually very short.
Table 3.3 shows the time statistics corresponding to decay factors between 72%− 80%.
For such a large value of the decay factors, the median is a better indication of the performance
of the algorithm than the average since some cases may take a relatively long time while the
majority of the cases take a short time. At 72% and 74% the results are promising. The 10,000
cases were solved in an average of 22.3 and 62.4 seconds, respectively. At 72% decay factor,
92% of the cases were recovered in less than 10 seconds, while a similar percentage were
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Table 3.2: Run-time statistics for decay factors 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, and 70%.







Min 0.046 0.046 0.062 0.062 0.078
Max 0.593 0.140 0.187 0.593 207.171
Avg. 0.064 0.066 0.074 0.102 1.233
St.Dev 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.028 4.899





Min 0.000a 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Max 0.015 0.015 0.078 2.094 737,266.687
Avg. 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.174 300.897
St.Dev 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.772 10,677.913
Med. 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.031 4.938
a. The value 0.000 means that it less than 1/64
recovered in less than one minute with 74% decay factor. Due to the extended time for key
recovery with decay factors 76%, 78%, and 80%, less cases were examined. For β = 80%,
the CryptoMiniSat search did not terminate for 10 days in the 8th case. Furthermore, in one of
the successfully terminated 7 cases, the key returned by the SAT solver was different from the
original key. The original key could have been easily found by re-running the SAT solver again
after adding a clause to exclude the found key.
Table 3.3: Run-time statistics for decay factors 72%, 74%, 76%, 78%, and 80%.
β 72% 74% 76% 78% 80%
Min 0.078 0.109 0.156 0.625 38.65b
Max 109794 126772 84819 19987 5523.8b
Avg. 22.271 62.404 799.327 6958.473 1901.95b
St.Dev 1155.83 1373.14 5423.73 25880.70 2119.58b
Med. 0.812 2.656 14.578 173.508 685.046b
# Tests 10000 10000 1000 100 7
b. These statistics excludes the 8th case where the search did not terminate for 10 days
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we modeled the problem of key recovery of the AES-128 key schedules
from its corresponding decayed memory images as a Boolean SAT problem and solved it using
the CryptoMiniSat solver. Our experimental results confirm the versatility of our proposed
approach which allows us to efficiently recover the AES-128 key schedules for large decay
factors. The method presented in this work can be extended in a straightforward way to AES-
192, AES-256 and other ciphers with key schedules that can be presented as a set of Boolean
equations and, hence, lend themselves naturally to SAT solvers.
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Chapter 4
Fault Attacks Against the NTRU
Cryptosystems and their Countermeasures
4.1 Introduction
The NTRU encryption algorithm, also known as NTRUEncrypt, is a parameterized fam-
ily of lattice-based public key cryptosystems [84, 87]. Both the encryption and decryption
operations in NTRU are based on simple polynomial multiplication which makes it very fast
compared to other alternatives such as RSA, and elliptic-curve-based systems [97]. Recently,
the NTRU system has been accepted to the IEEE P1363 standards under the specifications for
lattice-based public-key cryptography. In the past few years, the security of NTRUEncrypt
was analyzed by many researchers (e.g., [95, 119, 142, 171]). One challenging aspect in crypt-
analyzing the NTRU encryption algorithm is its large number of variants and many possible
instantiations.
NTRUSign [42, 80, 81, 87] is a parameterized family of lattice-based public key digital
signature schemes that is currently under consideration for standardization by the IEEE P1363
working group. It was proposed after the original NTRU Signature Scheme (NSS) [86] was
broken [64, 65]. Similar to the GGH cryptosystem [68], the security of NTRUSign is related
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to the hardness of approximating the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) in a lattice. However,
NTRUSign uses a compact lattice, referred to as the NTRU lattices, instead of the GGH lattices
[87]. This NTRU lattice has the property that a private 2n-dimensional basis for the lattice
can be described with 2 vectors, each with n coefficients, and a public basis can be described
with a single n-dimensional vector. This enables public keys to be represented in O(n log n)
space, rather than O(n2) as is the case with GGH signature schemes. Furthermore, operations
take O(n2) time, as opposed to O(n3) for elliptic curve based cryptosystems and RSA private
key operations. In April, 2011, Security Innovation, the company that developed the NTRU
cryptosystems, announced that its NTRU cryptosystem is approved by the Accredited Standards
Committee X9 as a new encryption standard to protect data for financial transactions.
During the past few years, several attempts to analyze the security of NTRUSign were
presented. Min et al. [128] showed that the original version of NTRUSign signature scheme [81]
which was proposed at CT-RSA’03 is not secure in terms of being strongly existential forgeable,
i.e., it is malleable. The proposed attack allows an adversary to forge new signatures for a
message of her choice, given a signature for this message. This forgery requires a specific
polynomial with a small coefficient satisfying its norm value equal to zero. Even if this forgery
does not admit an adversary to change the message, this attack limits the applications of this
version of NTRUSign, which does not use perturbation, in several applications.
Szydlo [181] introduced a new lattice reduction technique applicable to the class of hy-
percubic lattices which arise during transcript analysis of certain NTRUSign signature schemes.
After a few thousand signatures, key recovery amounts to discovering a hidden unitary matrix
from its Gram matrix [181]. This case of the Gram matrix factorization problem is equivalent
to finding the shortest vectors in the hypercubic lattice defined by a quadratic form. This work
on reduction of hypercubic lattices shows that the transcript attacks are relevant to the security
of the NTRUSign schemes. The practical security threat to the schemes, however, was not clear
given the required large number of oracle calls. Furthermore, the attack does not seem to be
applicable to NTRUSign with perturbation.
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Nguyen and Regev [143] presented the first successful key-recovery attack on NTRUSign-
251 without perturbation [80, 81]. Experimentally, this attack requires about 400 signatures to
recover the secret key of this non-perturbed version of NTRUSign. The main idea of the attack
is based on the following learning problem: given many random points uniformly distributed
over an unknown n-dimensional parallelepiped, recover the parallelepiped or an approximation
thereof. Nguyen and Regev transformed this problem into a multivariate optimization problem
which they solved by a gradient descent. Again, this attack does not seem to be directly appli-
cable to NTRUSign with perturbation where, in this case, the attacker has to solve an extension
of the hidden parallelepiped problem in which the parallelepiped is replaced by the Minkowski
sum of two hidden parallelepipeds where the lattice spanned by one of the parallelepipeds is
public but the other one is not.
Fault analysis is an example of SCAs in which the attacker is assumed to be able to
induce faults in the cryptographic device and observe the faulty output. Then, by careful in-
spection of the faulty output, the attacker recovers the secret information, such as secret inner
state or secret key. In fault analysis attacks, some kind of physical influence such as variations
in the supply voltage, external clock, or temperature beyond the nominal operating range of the
device, results in a corruption of the internal memory or the computation process. Other tech-
niques for fault injections include subjecting the device to white light, laser beams, X-rays, or
ion beams [16]. The examination of the output under such faults often reveals some information
about the cipher key or the secret inner state. The first fault analysis attack targeted the RSA
cryptosystem [29] and subsequently, fault analysis attacks were expanded to various cryptosys-
tems (e.g., [23,79,154]) and were extended to other digital signature schemes (e.g., [23,24,66]).
Furthermore, fault analysis attacks became a more realistic serious threat after cheap and low-
tech methods of applying faults were presented [11].
Other variants of fault analysis attacks against the RSA cryptosystem were also inves-
tigated. The perturbation of public elements was considered as a real threat when Seifert pre-
sented an attack on the RSA signature checking mechanism [133, 163]. Then, Brier et al. [31]
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extended this work to full recovery of the private signing exponent for various RSA implemen-
tations. Berzati et al. [21, 22] address the issue of modifying the modulus during the exponen-
tiation. Fault analysis attacks were also extended to symmetric systems such as DES [25] and
later to AES [54]. Fault attacks against stream ciphers were introduced by Hoch et al. [79].
Different assumptions are usually made regarding both timing and location of the in-
jected faults [27]. The number of required faults in fault attacks varies depending on the as-
sumed model. In particular, some strong fault models assume that the adversary has precise full
control on both timing and location of injected faults which implies that the attacker has full
control on the location of faulted bits as well as the attacked operation.
In this work, we present a fault analysis attack on the original NTRUEncrypt algorithm
proposed in [84] and on the NTRUSign signature scheme. The fault model that we utilize in
this work is slightly more relaxed. In particular, we assume that the attacker is able to fault a
small number of coefficients in a specific polynomial during the decryption/ signing process but
cannot control the exact location of the injected transient faults.
4.2 Fault analysis of NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem
4.2.1 Description of the NTRUEncrypt encryption algorithm
The NTRU encryption algorithm is a lattice-based public key cryptosystems that is pa-
rameterized by three integers: (N, p, q), where N is prime, gcd(p, q) = 1 and p << q. Let R,











The product of two polynomials a(x), b(x) ∈ R is given by
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j=k−i (mod N) aibj.
(4.1)
For any positive integers d1 and d2, let τ(d1, d2) denote the set of ternary polynomials
given by 

a(x) ∈ R :
a(x) has d1 coefficients equal to 1,
a(x) has d2 coefficients equal to -1,
all other coefficients equal to 0


In what follows, we briefly describe the key generation, encryption and decryption oper-
ations in the NTRU cryptosystem [87].
Key Generation
• Choose a private f(x) ∈ τ(df , df − 1) that is invertible in Rq and Rp.
• Choose a private g(x) ∈ τ(dg, dg).
• Compute Fq(x) = f
−1(x) in Rq and Fp(x) = f
−1(x) in Rp.
• Compute h(x) = Fq(x) ⋆ g(x) in Rq.
The polynomial h(x) is the user’s public key. The corresponding private key is the pair
(f(x), Fp(x)). The following steps denote the encryption process for plaintextm(x) ∈ Rp.
Encryption
• Choose a random ephemeral key r(x) ∈ τ(dr, dr).
• Compute the ciphertext e(x) = pr(x) ⋆ h(x) +m(x) mod q.
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Decryption
• Compute a(x) = f(x) ⋆ e(x) mod q.
• Compute b(x) = Centerlift (a(x)) such that its coefficients lie in the interval (−q/2, q/2].
• Computem = Fp(x) ⋆ b(x) mod p.
Table 4.1: The parameter sets for NTRU in [85]
N p q df dg dr
Moderate Security 167 3 128 61 20 18
High Security 263 3 128 50 24 16
Highest Security 503 3 256 216 72 55
Table 4.1 shows some suggested choices for (N, p, q) for different security levels of the
original NTRUEncryption algorithm [85].
By choosing f(x) = 1 + pf1(x), where f1(x) ∈ R in the key generation step, the poly-
nomial multiplication in the last decryption step is eliminated since we will have Fp(x) = 1
mod p. In this case, Hoffstein and Silverman [88, 89] described a method for speeding up
the encryption and decryption processes through the use of products of low Hamming weight
polynomials. They use three low Hamming weight polynomials r1(x), r2(x), and r3(x) such
that r(x) = r1(x) ⋆ r2(x) + r3(x) in encryption and f1(x), f2(x), and f3(x) such that f(x) =
f1(x) ⋆ f2(x) + f3(x) in decryption. For example, at (N, p, q) = (1171, 3, 2048) the num-
ber of non-zero coefficients for each ri(x) and fi(x) is 5. The convolution multiplication for
encryption t(x) = r(x) ⋆ h(x) mod q can be calculated as follows:
t1(x) = r2(x) ⋆ h(x),
t2(x) = r3(x) ⋆ h(x),
t3(x) = r1(x) ⋆ t1(x),




Similar to the case of attacking any public key cryptosystem, our proposed fault analysis
attack targets the decryption process which, as explained in the previous section, contains three
main operations. We assume that the attacker is able to fault a small number of coefficients of
the polynomial input to (or output from) the second step of the decryption process but cannot
control the exact location of the injected fault. In particular, as depicted in Figure 4.1, we
assume that the attacker is able to fault small number of coefficients of the polynomial input to




???? = ???? ⋆ ???? ?mod ?? 
????? = Centerlift ?????? 
 
???? = ?? ??? ⋆ ????? ?mod ?? 
???? = ???? ⋆ ???? ?mod ?? 
???? = Centerlift ?????? 
 
???? = ?? ??? ⋆ ????? ?mod ?? 
b) 
Figure 4.1: The decryption process after inducing faults: a) before the centerlift operation or b)
after the centerlift operation





ij ∈ Rq, 0 ≤ ij < N , denotes the resulting error polynomial with
t non zero coefficients in the locations corresponding to the injected faults. Thus, the attacker
can calculate
∆m(x) = m̂(x)−m(x) = ϵp(x) ⋆ Fp(x) mod p, (4.3)
where ϵp(x) = ϵ(x) mod p.
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Then, the attacker can obtain candidates for the secret key as
f(x) = (∆m(x))−1 ⋆ ϵp(x) mod p (4.4)
by exhaustively trying all possible values for ϵp(x) with the pre-specified small number of non
zero coefficients. The right secret key can be determined by performing the encryption process
on the ciphetext and comparing the result with the original plaintext.
4.2.3 Complexity and success probability of the proposed attack
For typical values of p and q, a non zero coefficient in ϵ(x) ∈ Rq will be mapped to
different values in Zp with almost equal probabilities (≈
1
p
) after reduction modulo p (e.g.,














for q = 128). To simplify our analysis, in
what follows we assume that a non zero coefficient in ϵ(x) ∈ Rq will be mapped to different




The above attack succeeds if, and only if, ∆m(x) ∈ Rp is invertible. From Equation
(4.3), this requires that ϵp(x) = ϵ(x) mod p to be invertible (note that Fp is guaranteed to be
invertible by the key generation process.) Let n ≥ 1 be the smallest integer such that pn ≡ 1










which is approximately equal to (1 − 1
p
) for the typical choice of the parameters (e.g.,
for p = 3, we have n = 83, 131, 251 for N = 167, 263, 503, respectively.)
If the fault injection procedure ensures that the number of injected faults is less than





= O((pN)t) calculations of multiplicative
inverse in Rp which can be done efficiently using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
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4.2.4 Proposed countermeasures
To secure cryptographic devices against fault attacks, proper countermeasures have to
be applied in order to detect any transient or permanent faults and prevent the attacker from
accessing the faulty output by immediately disabling the device output or resting all the output
bits to 0s. Several techniques of fault detection have been investigated [117]. These techniques
include error detection codes and redundancy-based techniques. In what follows, we investigate
different approaches to deploy the above fault detection techniques in hardware implementations
of NTRUEncrypt and study the trade-off between the fault coverage and the hardware area and
the throughput overheads.
Spatial and temporal duplication
Applying spatial duplication to the decryption process is quite straightforward. Spatial
duplication requires redundant hardware to allow independent calculations so that faults injected
into one hardware unit do not affect (in the same way) the other unit(s).
A different approach for applying duplication relies on having a separate hardware mod-
ule for executing the encryption process. After completing the decryption, the encryption unit
is applied to the resulting plaintext, and only if the result of the encryption is equal to the orig-
inal ciphertext, then the system considered fault-free. In this section we explore the trade-off
between different spatial and temporal duplication options applicable to NTRUEncrypt.
• Decryption-Decryption
Figure 4.2 shows the case where error detection is achieved by duplicating the decryption
operation. Note that throughout our work, we exclude the possibility of higher order
faults where the attacker is able to fault the error detection circuity, e.g., by forcing the
multiplexer in Figure 4.2 to always output m irrespective of the value of its error control
signal.
While full spatial duplication has practically no impact on the throughput and it can de-
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tect both permanent and transient faults, the associated area overhead is considerable.
Instead, a large saving in the area can be achieved by utilizing temporal redundancy. A
naı¨ve implementation of this approach would practically double the decryption time. In
our implementation, however, the convolution operation f ⋆ e required by the second de-
cryption operation is performed at the same time with the operation Fp ⋆ b. Thus the
decryption time grows from ≈ 2N to ≈ 3N (instead of ≈ 4N ).
• Decryption-Rotation-Decryption
Applying temporal redundancy only will not detect permanent faults. The following
Lemma shows how this limitation can be alleviated by applying the redundant decryp-
tion operation on a related ciphertext.
 ???? ???? ?? ??? 
?̀??? = ???? ⋆ ???? ?mod ?? 
?? ??? = Centerlift ??̀???? 






0       1 
???? = ???? ⋆ ???? ?mod ?? 
???? = Centerlift ?????? 
???? = ?? ??? ⋆ ?????mod ?? 
 
Figure 4.2: Detecting errors using the duplication method (decryption followed by decryption).
When temporal redundancy is used, a`(x) is calculated at the same time with m(x) using the
same hardware used to calculate a(x).




0 < s ≤ N − 1, i.e., e(s)(x) = (e(x) >>> s) (In other words, the coefficients of e(s)(x)
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are obtained by rotating the coefficients of e(x) by s positions.) Then the plaintext m`
corresponding to the decryption of e(s)(x) is equal to (m(x) >>> s) where m(x) is the
plaintext corresponding to the decryption of e(x).
Proof: Since, the coefficients of e(s)(x) are obtained by rotating the coefficients of
e(x) by s positions, we have e(s)(x) =
∑N−1
i=0 eix
i+s (mod N) = xs ⋆ e(x).
Let a` and b` denote the intermediate computation results during the decryption of e(s)(x).
Then we have
a` = e(s)(x) ⋆ f(x) mod q
= (xs ⋆ e(x)) ⋆ f(x) mod q
= xs ⋆ (e(x) ⋆ f(x)) mod q
= xs ⋆ a(x)⇒
b` = Centerlift (a`)
= xs ⋆ Centerlift (a(x))
= xs ⋆ b(x)⇒
m` = b` ⋆ Fp(x) mod p
= (xs ⋆ b(x)) ⋆ Fp(x) mod p
= xs ⋆ (b(x) ⋆ Fp(x)) mod p
= xs ⋆ m(x).
Thus, in order to detect permanent faults when temporal redundancy is utilized, the redun-
dant computation can be performed using a rotated version of the ciphertext and the two
plaintexts are compared as shown in Figure 4.3. Again, resource sharing and pipelining
are used between the two decryption processes in the same way as when no rotation was
employed.
• Decryption-Encryption
A naı¨ve implementation for this approach would be to perform all the encryption steps
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Figure 4.3: Detecting errors by using the duplication method (decryption of a ciphertext and its
rotated version)
after the decryption is finished which dramatically reduces the systems throughput.
As depicted in Figure 4.4, in order to speed up this approach, all the encryption opera-
tions including the convolution step required by the encryption process can be performed
before the plaintext is produced because only the last addition operation in the encryption
process requires the availability of the plaintext. In our implementation, both convolution
operations for the encryption r ⋆ h and decryption Fp ⋆ b are performed simultaneously in
N clock cycles. Similar to the above two approaches, this scheme recovers 100% of the
induced transient and permanent errors.
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Figure 4.4: Detecting errors by using the duplication method (decryption followed by encryp-
tion)
Error-detecting codes
The basic idea of code-based fault detection schemes is that a checksum code for the
output of a given module can be predicted from the input to this module and consequently it
can be compared to the actual checksum calculated from the output. The disadvantage of this
technique is that corrupted bits may affect the code in such a way that errors may not be detected.
Unlike the case of symmetric key ciphers, where traditional parity based error detection
codes (over GF (2)) are somewhat straightforward to derive for the intermediate computation
steps of the cipher, this does not seem to be the case for many public key systems including
NTRUEncrypt. On the other hand, the algebraic properties of the polynomials convolutional
product allow us develop simple check sum fault detection techniques which detect both tran-
sient and permanent faults. The following Lemmas will be utilized in the development of our
EDC based techniques.











i denote the ciphertext, plaintext and intermediate computation results as defined in
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From the key generation process, we have f(x) ∈ τ(df , df − 1). Thus
∑N−1









The second part of the Lemma follows by noting that from the definition of the Centerlift
operation, we have ai = bi mod q, i = 0, · · · , N − 1.
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Figure 4.5 shows how the checksum equation of Lemma 4.2 can be applied to imple-
ment error detection for errors inserted before or after the calculation of the Centerlift operation
(corresponding to Figure 4.1-a and Figure 4.1-b, respectively).
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Figure 4.5: Detecting errors by using checksum EDC from Lemma 4.2





ij ∈ Rq, 0 ≤ ij < N , denotes the resulting error polynomial with t non
zero coefficients in the locations corresponding to the injected faults. From Lemma 4.2, it is
clear that this checksum error detection method cannot detect errors if
t∑
ij=1
ϵij = 0. Assuming
that the coefficients of the injected errors are uniformity distributed over Zq and by noting that,
in this case, the function
t∑
ij=1
ϵij is a balanced function, i.e., it assumes all possible values in
{0, 1, · · · q− 1} with equal probability = 1
q
. Then, by ignoring the possibility of simultaneously






In what follows, we show that a mod p checksum formula that holds between the input
and output of the third decryption step. Using the same notation as in Lemma 4.2, in what
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follows and using Lemma 4.3, 4.4, we derive a checksum formula (mod p) that holds between
the input and output of the last step in the decryption process.





i, where F ip is the coefficient of x





F ip) mod p = 1.














f0 fN−1 . . . f1
f1 f0 . . . fN−2
· · · ·
· · · ·
· · · ·
















(F 0p f0 + F
1
p fN−1 + · · ·+ F
N−1
p f1) mod p
(F 0p f1 + F
1
p f0 + · · ·+ F
N−1




(F 0p fN−1 + F
1
p fN−2 + · · ·+ F
N−1




Again, by noting that
∑N−1







fj) mod p = 1⇒ (
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Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2, we express the convolution operation m(x) =
b(x) ⋆ Fp(x) mod p in matrix form. Then, the proof follows by utilizing the result of Lemma
4.3 to simplify the resulting summation.
In our implementation, we did not utilize the above mod p checksum since it does not
improve the overall error detection capability of our implementation. In particular, for the im-
plementation shown in Figure 4.5, in order to be able to detect errors that might be injected
in b(x) during the calculations of m in the third step of the decryption process, this step is
performed on the same set of registers that hold the result of the Centerlift operation mod q.
Consequently, any injected errors in the coefficients of b(x) during the calculation of m(x) can
be detected, with probability 1− 1
q
, by the checksum in the figure. In the next section we show
how we can improve the area requirement of this approach without impacting the error detection
capability.
Combining spatial redundancy and error detection codes
While visualizing the decryption process as composed of three separate steps (see section
4.2.1) allows us to better understand the mathematics behind it, for hardware implementations,
we do not have to separate these three steps. In particular, since the coefficients of b are even-
tually reduced mod p during the calculation of m in the third step of the decryption, one can
directly evaluate the Centerlift operation and reduce the coefficient of b(x) mod p in one step.
In our FPGA prototype, modular reduction mod p is implemented using the algorithm for mod-
ular reduction mod Mersenne primes (see Algorithm 3.1 in [189]). As depicted in Figure 4.6,
spatial duplication is applied to detect errors in the mod p operations by duplicating the calcula-
tion of Centerlift(a(x)) mod p and storing the results in two different registers, b and b`. In this
case, by comparing the two registers, any error occurring during the calculation of any of them
can be detected with 100% probability. On the other hand, if the attacker induces a fault in the
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polynomial a(x), this duplication cannot detect this error because the registers b and b` will be
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Figure 4.6: Detecting errors using checksum EDC and spatial redundancy
4.2.5 FPGA implementation results
We used the Xilinx ISE 9.1i framework to prototype our protected NTRUEncrypt hard-
ware with parameters (N, p, q, df, dg, dr) = (167, 3, 128, 61, 20, 18). The synthesis was per-
formed with XST application and the simulation was performed using Modelsim. The target
FPGA is xcv1000e from Xilinx Virtex-E family.
At the beginning of the decryption operation, the private key f(x) ∈ Rp is loaded into
the chip through N parallel I/O PINS in Tld(f) = ⌈log2(p)⌉ clock cycles. Similarly, the private
key Fp(x) is loaded in Tld(Fp) = ⌈log2(p)⌉ clock cycles. The ciphertext e(x) is then loaded in
log2(q) clock cycles. When the encryption process in required by the redundancy scheme, h
and r are loaded in Tld(h) = log2(q) and Tld(r) = ⌈log2(p)⌉ clock cycles, respectively. The most
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time consuming steps are the convolution operations which require Tconv(·,·) = N clock cycles,
each.
The Centerlift operation, Tcl(.), consumes one clock cycle. Furthermore, Tout(m) =
⌈log2(p)⌉ clock cycles are be required to output the plaintext m(x) using N parallel I/O PINS.
Let Tsum(a) and Tsum(b) denotes the number of clock cycles for accumulating the coefficients of
the register a mod q and b mod q, respectively. Figure 4.7 shows a simplified time-line for the
operations required by the above approaches. The figure also illustrates the operations that are
performed in parallel and those that utilize resource sharing. In the figure, the time between the
vertical dashed lines represents the number of clock cycles required to perform one decryption
operation for the input block assuming that the private key, and when applicable the public key,
are already loaded into the chip.
The IEEE standard 1363.1-2008 specifies a message encoding scheme (from binary to
ternary) for NTRUEncrypt. In particular, each three bits of the binary presentation of the mes-
sage is converted to two ternary coefficients as follows
{0, 0, 0} → {0, 0}, {0, 0, 1} → {0, 1},
{0, 1, 0} → {0,−1}, {0, 1, 1} → {1, 0},
{1, 0, 0} → {1, 1}, {1, 0, 1} → {1,−1},
{1, 1, 0} → {−1, 0}, {1, 1, 1} → {−1, 1}.
Given this encoding scheme, each block with N coefficients can be used to encode a





Clock cycles required to decrypt one block
.
For all designs, the clock frequencies calculated by the synthesis tool were& 55.4MHz.
Table 4.2 shows the FPGA resources, throughput and error detection capability of all the above
proposed architectures when running at 55 MHz. It should be noted that the above performance
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Figure 4.7: Time-line (not to scale) of operations performed by the proposed architectures.
Operations performed using resource sharing are shown in dotted lines
one cannot simply convert the message to trinary and apply the raw NTRU encryption process.
The message needs to be pre-processed before encryption and post-processed after encryption to
protect against active attackers. The necessary processing is specified in IEEE Std 1363.1-2008,
and discussed in [90].
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Table 4.2: FPGA implementation results for the raw NTRUEncrypt decryption with parameters (N ,p,q,df ,dg,dr) = (167,3,128,61,20,18)
Dec-only Dec-Dec Dec-rot-Dec Dec-Enc EDC-only EDC-duplication
Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3 Figure 4.4 Figure 4.5 Figure 4.6
# of Slices 3423 3636 4890 7853 4647 4260
# of Slice FFs 3919 4218 4234 5390 3579 4236
# of 4-input LUTs 5938 6094 8457 14399 8527 7651
# of IOBs 337 337 337 337 337 337
#Slices overhead (%) - 6.22% 42.86% 129.42% 35.76% 24.45%
#Clk cycles per block 2N + 10 3N + 11 3N + 11 2N + 13 2N + 10 2N + 10
Throughput (K Blocks/sec) 160 107 107 159 160 160
Throughput (Mbps) 40.05 26.91 26.91 39.70 40.05 40.05
Throughput degradation (%) - 32.81% 32.81% 0.86% - -
Type of detected faults - transient transient, transient, transient, transient,
permanent permanent permanent permanent
Error detection probability - 100% 100% 100% 99.22% 99.22%
5
1
4.3 Fault analysis of NTRUSign digital signature scheme
One main advantage of the NTRU family of cryptosystems (i.e., both NTRUEncrypt and
NTRUSign) is that NTRU is smaller and faster than other public key cryptosystems. According
to the performance benchmarks published on the NTRU company website (http://www.ntru.com/
security-lab/), NTRU is about 5 to 200 times faster than RSA and ECC with similar security
parameters. A recent comparison between hardware implementations of different digital sig-
nature schemes [53] shows that the power consumption of NTRUSign is significantly less than
any other digital signature scheme published so far. These small footprints make NTRUsign
ideal for handheld mobile devices, sensors, RFIDs, smartcards, and other resource constrained
devices with limited computing resources. On the other hand, the typical deployment environ-
ment for these resource constrained devices makes it particularly susceptible to various forms of
SCAs including fault analysis which has become a serious threat after cheap and low-tech meth-
ods of applying faults were presented [174]. It should also be noted that the limited resources
and the extreme lightweight requirements make the implementation of various countermeasures
against these attacks a more challenging task compared to other environments.
4.3.1 Description of NTRUSign
In this section, we briefly review some of the basic definitions and notations as defined
in section 4.2.1. The key underlying structure of NTRUSign is the polynomial ring R, where
N is a prime integer. The signatures and the messages use a polynomial ring Rq where the
coefficients are taken mod q.
For a real number r, let ⌊r⌉ denote the closest integer to r. From the NTRUSign spec-
ifications [42], ⌊r⌉ is evaluated as ⌊r⌉ = ⌊r + 0.5⌋ where ⌊·⌋ denotes the floor function of the
enclosed argument. Similarly, if a is a polynomial with real coefficients, ⌊a⌉ denotes that this




i be a polynomial in R. The centered norm of a(x) is defined as
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the non-negative real number satisfying
∥a(x)∥2 =
∑N−1












where µa = (1/N)
∑N−1
i=0 ai is the average of the coefficients of a(x). The centered





The original variant of the NTRUSign algorithm was proposed in [80]. A perturbation
technique was later introduced in order to enhance the security of this scheme, particularly,
against transcript attacks. Algorithm 2 shows this enhanced version of NTRUSign [42, 81, 87].
The original scheme can be seen as a special case of Algorithm 2 with B = 0.
4.3.2 Proposed attack
To simplify our discussion, we first consider the NTRUSign with the “standard” NTRU
lattice [81]. Steps 1-4 of the signing procedure in Algorithm 2 serve only to add perturbation
δ to the original message m. Step 5 performs the actual signature operation, using the original
NTRUSign scheme, on m′ = m + δ. Since δ is designed to be small enough, a valid signature
on m′ will be a valid signature on m. Our attack utilizes the fact that an attacker only needs
to recover f0, and consequently calculate g0, in order to forge a signature that would pass the
verification step in Algorithm 2. In other words, signatures generated by the setting B = 0 in
the signing algorithm, i.e., with no perturbation, will pass the verification algorithm even if the
verifier assumes that it was generated with B > 0. In fact, it will pass the verification step even
if different sets of F and G are utilized as long as they satisfy the condition identified in step
2.ii in the key generation procedure of Algorithm 2.
The fault model in which we analyze NTRUSign is the one in which the attacker is
assumed to be able to inject a transient fault in a small number of coefficients of the polynomial
A or B in the signing algorithm (see step 6 in Figure 4.8) but cannot control the exact location
of injected faults, i.e., cannot specify which polynomial coefficients are to be corrupted by the
induced faults.
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Algorithm 2 NTRUSign with perturbation [80–83]
Key Generation
1: INPUT: Integers(N ), q, N , B ≥ 0, (df , dg for binary polynomials), (d for trinary polynomials), and
the NTRU lattice type = “standard” or “transpose”. In the above set of parameters, N denotes the
dimension of the polynomial ring used, i.e., polynomials are up to degree N − 1. N denotes the
norm-bound.
2: Generate B private lattice bases and one public lattice basis: Set i=B. While i ≥ 0 do:
i. Randomly choose binary polynomials f , g ∈ R with (df , dg) ones. For the parameter sets
defined in [82, 83], choose trinary polynomials f , g with (d + 1) +1s and d -1s. f needs to be
invertible in Rq in case of using NTRU lattice type = “standard” and g needs to be invertible in
Rq in case of using NTRU lattice type = “transpose”.
ii. Find small polynomials F , G ∈ R such that f ⋆ G− F ⋆ g = q.
iii. Set fi = f . If NTRU lattice type = “standard”, set f
′
i = Fi and hi = f
−1
i ⋆ gi mod q. If NTRU
lattice type = “transpose”, set f ′i = gi and hi = f
−1
i ⋆ Fi mod q. Set i=i-1.
3: PUBLIC OUTPUT: The input parameters and the public key h = h0.
4: PRIVATE OUTPUT: The set of polynomial {fi, f ′i , hi} for i=0..B.
Signing
1: INPUT: A digital document D ∈ D (a digital document space) and the private key set {fi, f ′i , hi}
for i = 0 · · · B.
2: Set r=0.
3: Set s=0, i=0. Encode r as a bit string. Setm0=H(D ∥ r), where “∥” denotes the concatenation. Set
m=m0.
4: Perturb the point using the private lattices: While i ≥ 1:
i. Calculate A = ⌊
−f ′i⋆m
q ⌉, B = ⌊
fi⋆m
q ⌉, si = A ⋆ fi +B ⋆ f
′
i mod q.
ii. Setm = si ⋆ hi − hi−1 mod q.
iii. Set s = s+ si. Set i = i− 1.
5: Sign the perturbed point using the lattice public key:
Set A = ⌊
−f ′0⋆m
q ⌉, B = ⌊
f0⋆m
q ⌉, s0 = A ⋆ f0 +B ⋆ f
′
0 mod q, s = s+ s0.
6: Check the signature:
i. Set b = ∥s, s ⋆ h−m0 mod q∥.
ii. If b ≥ N . Set r = r + 1 and go to step 3.
7: OUTPUT: The triplet (D, r, s).
Verifying
1: INPUT: A signed document(D, r, s) and the public key h
2: Encode r as a bit string. Setm=H(D ∥ r).
3: Set b = ∥s, s ⋆ h−m0 mod q∥.
4: OUTPUT: “valid” if b < N , “invalid” otherwise.
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Figure 4.8: Fault injection in the NTRUSign algorithm
If the fault injection process guarantees that number of faulted polynomial coefficients
is upper bounded by t, then the resulting faulty signature is given by
ŝ = s1 + ŝ0,
where
ŝ0 = Â ⋆ f0 +B ⋆ f
′
0 mod q,




ij ∈ Rq, 0 ≤ ij < N , denotes the resulting error polynomial
with t non zero coefficients in the locations corresponding to the injected faults. Thus, the
attacker can calculate the difference between the faulty signature and the correct one as follows:
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∆s = ŝ− s = (s1 + ŝ0)− (s1 + s0)
= ŝ0 − s0 = ϵ ⋆ f0 mod q.
The attacker can obtain the secret key f0 as
f0 = ϵ
−1 ⋆∆s mod q





= O((qN)t) values for ϵ(x)with the pre-specified
small number of non zero coefficients. Calculating the multiplicative inverse of ϵ in Rq can be
done efficiently using the Newton iteration method [170]. Then, the attacker calculates
g0 = f0 ⋆ h mod q,
The attacker can verify the correctness of the obtained solution by running the verification al-
gorithm on signatures produced by these recovered keys.
The success of the above attack requires that ϵ is invertible in Rq. For q = p
l is a power
of a prime p and N is a prime number, let n ≥ 1 be the smallest integer such that pn ≡ 1 mod










which is approximately equal to (1−1
p
) for the typical choice of the parameters of the NTRUSign
algorithm. For example, for N = 251 and q = 128 [81], we have p=2 and n=50. Consequently,




Our analysis above ignores the fact that the signature procedure might be implemented
in such a way that the attacker may not have access to the faulty signature if it does not pass the
norm-bound checking (step 6 in the signing procedure in Algorithm 2). While the NTRUsign
designers have previously suggested that, depending on the application, this step might be
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skipped for NTRUSign with no perturbation in order to improve the efficiency of the signing
process (see section 6.4 in [80]), this is not the case for NTRUSign with B > 0.
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the percentage of cases in which the faulted signatures pass
this check for 10 random messages and 1000 fault injections for each message for the parameter
set (N , q, df , dg, B, “type”, N ) =(251, 128, 73, 71, B, standard, 310) [81] for B = 0 and
B = 1, respectively. In the above set of parameters, N denotes the dimension of the polynomial
ring used, i.e., polynomials are up to degree N − 1, N denotes the norm-bound, df , dg denote
the Hamming weight of the binary polynomials f and g used in the key generation step of the
algorithm, B = 0 corresponds to the system with no perturbation and B = 1 corresponds to the
system with perturbation (see Algorithm 2 for further clarification of these parameters.) The
experimental results were obtained by simulating the process of fault injection in our MAPLE
software implementation of NTRUSign.
Table 4.3: Experimental results for NTRUSign with (N , q, df , dg, B, “type”, N ) =(251, 128,
73, 71, 0, standard, 310)
t ϵ is non-invertible
ϵ is invertible
probability of successful fault injection
fail pass
1 4901 3153 1946 0.1946
2 4917 4563 520 0.0520
3 5093 4789 118 0.0118
Table 4.4: Experimental results for NTRUSign with (N , q, df , dg, B, “type”, N ) =(251, 128,
73, 71, 1, standard, 310)
t ϵ is non-invertible
ϵ is invertible
probability of successful fault injection
fail pass
1 4948 4051 1001 0.1001
2 4990 4857 153 0.0153
3 5016 4962 22 0.0022
From Table 4.3, if the number of faulted coefficients in A is 1, then about 1/0.195 ≈ 5
fault injections are required before the attacker is able to access the faculty signature which
57
Table 4.5: Experimental results for NTRUSign with (N , q, df , dg, B, “type”, N ) =(251, 128,
73, 71, 0, transpose, 310)
t ϵ is non-invertible
ϵ is invertible
probability of successful fault injection
fail pass
1 4944 4437 619 0.0619
2 5064 4893 43 0.0043
3 4089 5008 3 0.0003
Table 4.6: Experimental results for NTRUSign with (N , q, df , dg, B, “type”, N ) =(251, 128,
73, 71, 1, transpose, 310)
t ϵ is non-invertible
ϵ is invertible
probability of successful fault injection
fail pass
1 4948 4775 277 0.0277
2 5026 4965 9 0.0009
3 5049 5051 0 0.0000
corresponds to an invertible error polynomial ϵ ∈ Rq. It is also clear that the required number
of fault injections increases with t. If, for practical reasons, inducing such a large number of
transient fault injections is not possible, then a second order fault attack [111] can be utilized
in order to reduce the number of required fault injections. In this case, the attacker induces a
second fault in step 6 in the signing procedure of Algorithm 2 to skip this norm-bound check.
Similar analysis follows for type=“transpose”, i.e., when the signing process is per-
formed using the NTRU transpose lattice. However, in this case, g0 cannot be recovered from
the knowledge of the public key and f0. Thus the attacker has to repeat the attack by injecting
another fault in the computation of the polynomialB (step 6 in Figure 4.8). Tables 4.5 and Table
4.6 show the corresponding experimental results for NTRUSign with the transpose lattice.
The above set of experiments corresponds to the security parameters defined in the Effi-
cient Embedded Security Standards (EESS) standard [42] with a claimed security level equiv-
alent to RSA-1024 which is roughly equivalent in strength to 80-bit symmetric keys [42]. In
order to test the effect of changing the algorithm claimed theoretical security level on the per-
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k N d q β N t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
80 157 29 256 0.38407 150.02 0.0303 0.0012 0.0000
112 197 28 256 0.51492 206.91 0.0241 0.0011 0.0001
128 223 32 256 0.65515 277.52 0.0266 0.0012 0.0000
160 263 45 512 0.31583 276.53 0.0188 0.0007 0.0000
192 313 50 512 0.40600 384.41 0.0221 0.0008 0.0000
256 349 75 512 0.18543 368.62 0.0350 0.0031 0.0000
formance of our attack when the attacker cannot bypass the signature verification step, we per-
formed another set of experiments on NTRUSign with the new set of security parameters defined
in [82,83]. For this version of NTRUSign, the centered norm computation in step 3 of the verifi-
cation procedure in Algorithm 2 is defined as ∥s, s⋆h−m0∥
2 = ∥s∥2+β2||s⋆h−m0∥
2 where,
as shown in Table 4.7, different values of β are defined for each set of the security parameters
(see also section 2.3 in [82]). It should be noted that these parameters are only applicable to
the NTRUsign with the transpose NTRU lattice. Furthermore, in this version of NTRUSign, the
polynomials f and g have trinary coefficients ∈ {+1,−1, 0} with (d+1) +1s and (d) -1s while
in the EESS version of NTRUSign, f and g are binary polynomials with Hamming weight df
and dg, respectively.
The first column in Table 4.7 refers to the claimed security level, k, in bits. One inter-
esting observation, that follows from the experimental results in Table 4.7, is that increasing the
security parameter, which basically reflects the resistance against the best known lattice based
attacks, does not necessarily improve the resistance against our attack. It should also be noted
that if the attacker is able to skip the norm-bound checking step, then the probability of success-
ful fault insertion ≈ 1− 1
p
, does not vary with the choice of the security parameters since p = 2
for all of them. On the other hand, as depicted in the table, in the case where the attacker cannot
skip the norm-bound checking step, the precision of the fault injection process, i.e., the ability
of the attacker to bound the number of faulted polynomial coefficients, t, has a large influence
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on the success probability of the attack and also keeps the computation steps required for the
attack, O((qN)t), in the practical range.
4.3.3 Proposed countermeasures
To secure cryptographic devices against fault analysis, proper countermeasures have to
be applied. Generally, these countermeasures detect temporal or permanent faults which hap-
pen in the cryptosystem, and immediately, disable the device output or rest all the output bits to
0s. As a result, the attacker is prevented from observing the output of the faulty cryptographic
computations and hence the vulnerability of the cryptosystem to these attacks can be allevi-
ated. Several approaches of fault detection techniques have been investigated. These techniques
include error detecting codes and redundancy-based techniques [117].
Many ideas have been proposed to efficiently secure CRT based RSA signature compu-
tations against fault attacks. In [165], Shamir used a redundant way to compute the arguments
used in the CRT computation of the RSA signature and checked their correctness before RSA
combination. Shamir’s countermeasure has two drawbacks. It requires the secret exponent
which is not needed for the CRT computation of the signature and its error detection technique
is based on decisional tests that should be avoided since they can be bypassed by higher order
fault attacks which were introduced by Kim and Quisquater in [111] where they were able to
practically break the first-order countermeasures for the RSA cryptosystem. The main idea is
based on inducing the first fault during one of the exponentiation and then inducing a second
fault to skip the error checking routine in the RSA-CRT scheme. Yen et al. [194] noted that fault
injection on status register flags can bypass conditional checks in countermeasures. Hence, they
introduced the concept of infective computation which aims at infecting the resulting signature,
i.e., rendering it unusable for the attacker in the case where a fault is injected in one of the
two exponentiations. Several subsequent countermeasures employed this infective computation
approach [27, 28, 66, 96].
Unlike the case of symmetric key ciphers where parity based error detection codes are
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somewhat straightforward to derive for the intermediate computation steps of the cipher, this
does not seem to be the case for NTRUsign because of the nonlinearity of the operations in-
volved, especially the rounding operation, ⌊·⌉, in step 2 and step 6 of Figure 4.8. On the other
hand, the algebraic properties of the polynomials convolutional product defined by Equation
(4.1), allow us develop a redundancy-based fault detection technique which detects both tran-
sient and permanent faults. We have also developed another, independent, technique to defend
against second order fault analysis where the attacker is able to introduce another fault to skip
the fault detection check.
Recomputing with cyclically shifted messages
Let a(r)(x) ∈ R denote an r-cyclically shifted version of a(x) =
∑
i aix
i, 0 < r ≤ N−1.
The coefficients of a(r)(x) are obtained by rotating the coefficients of a(x) by r positions. Thus
we have a(r)(x) =
∑N−1
i=0 ai+r (mod N)x
i. Let c(x) = a(x)⋆b(x). Then we have a(r)(x)⋆b(x) =
c(r)(x) where c
(r)
i = ci+r (mod N).
Consequently, the coefficients of ⌊a
(r)(x)⋆b(x)
q
⌉ correspond to r-cyclically shifted version
of the coefficients of ⌊a(x)⋆b(x)
q
⌉. This fact can be utilized to introduce either spatial redundancy
or temporal redundancy where the redundant computation is performed using a rotated version
of m and the two signatures are compared as shown in Figure 4.9. If the result of the two
operations do not match, up to the chosen rotation r, then the output of the device is disabled
in order to prevent the attacker from accessing any information from the faulty signature. Note
that this technique has an advantage over straightforward application of temporal redundancy,
i.e., evaluating the signature on the same message for two times and comparing the result, since
the latter approach does not protect against permanent faults. To speed up computation in the
case of utilizing the temporal redundancy option, the added redundancy can be utilized at the
level of smaller building blocks, i.e., during the computation of A and B in step 6 of Figure 4.8.
However, applying this approach at the algorithm level has the advantage of being able to detect















Figure 4.9: Fault detection by recomputing with cyclically shifted messages
Defending against second order fault analysis attacks
In this section, we introduce another countermeasure which avoids decision test (i.e.,
the error checking that is performed by comparing the signature with the one resulting from
the redundant module such as the one shown in Figure 4.9) and consequently protects against
sophisticated attackers who are able to induce higher order faults that skip fault detection oper-
ations. Our approach is inspired by the fault infective computation technique proposed by Yen
et al. [194] to defend against fault attacks on the RSA digital signature scheme. The following
two Lemmas will be used to prove the correctness of our approach




⌉, where z and q are two integers. If an error occurs during the
computation of ⌊ z
q
⌉, then we have ⌊w⌉ ̸= 0.
Proof: Let w and w′ denote the results of correct and incorrect computations, respectively.














) and consequently ⌊w′⌉ ̸= 0, which proves the Lemma.
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Lemma 4.6 If z1, z2 are two non-negative integers, then
⌈
z1 + z2




0 if z1 = z2 = 0
1 otherwise.
Proof: Let z = z1 + z2. It is clear that
z
z+1




< 1 for z ≥ 1. It
follows that ⌈ z
z+1
⌉ = 0 if z = 0 and ⌈ z
z+1
⌉ = 1 otherwise. The Lemma follows by noting that
z = 0 if and only if z1 = z2 = 0.
To defend against higher order fault analysis of NTRUSign, step 5 in the signing proce-
dure of Algorithm 2 is replaced by the following steps
1. Calculate A = ⌊
−f ′0⋆m
q
⌉, B = ⌊f0⋆m
q
⌉,
2. Calculate AA = ⌊
−f ′0⋆m
q
− A⌉, BB = ⌊f0⋆m
q
− B⌉,
3. Set s0 = A ⋆ f0 +B ⋆ f
′
0 mod q,
4. Set z1 =
∑N−1
i=0 |AAi|, z2 =
∑N−1
i=0 |BBi|, where | · | denotes the absolute value of the
enclosed coefficient.





(s+ s0) mod q, where ⌈·⌉ denotes the ceiling operation.
From Lemma 4.5, the coefficients of the polynomials AA and BB will all be equal to
zeros if and only if no errors occur during the computation of this step. Consequently, and by






(s+ s0) mod q = q
0 × (s+ s0) mod q = (s+ s0) mod q
which corresponds to the correct output of Algorithm 2. On the other hand, if an error occurs,






(s+ s0) mod q = q × (s+ s0) mod q = 0,
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which prevents the attacker from recovering any useful information about the secret key. Note
that we raise q to the power of ⌈ z1+z2
z1+z2+1
⌉ ∈ {0, 1} instead of raising it to the power of z1 + z2
in order to avoid the unnecessarily computational complexity of performing the exponentiation
operation with a large exponent.
4.4 Conclusion
One difficulty with analyzing the NTRU encryption algorithm is its large number of
variants. Different choices of parameters can dramatically change the security of NTRU and
attacks against a specific instantiation may not succeed against other instantiations.
In this chapter, we presented a fault analysis attack against the original variant of the
NTRU encryption algorithm. Our attack does not work against more recent variants where f =
1 + pF for ternary or binary polynomial F since the bijection between Fp and f does not exist
in these variants. Extending our attack to constructions with padding is a challenging research
problem. Another interesting research direction is to consider how to exploit the wraps in the
centering algorithm by this kind of fault attacks. We also presented different techniques for
strengthening the resistance of NTRUEncrypt hardware implementations against fault attacks.
We provided a comparison between these different techniques in terms of their error detection
capabilities as well as area and throughput overheads. We also provided FPGA implementation
results for these approaches.
As shown in Table 4.2, EDC based approaches can provide error detection up to 1− 1
q
=
99.22% for the implemented system parameters. While this error detection capability might
be suitable for protecting implementations against non malicious faults, in security sensitive
applications where transient faults can be maliciously injected, we believe that this level of
protection is not enough. Fault attacks are getting better and the number of required faults
are getting smaller. Thus, from Table 4.2, in these situation the system designer can choose




= 1.5 and a relatively small area overhead) and the decryption-encryption option with
a relatively large area overhead but practically very little impact on throughput. Developing
the corresponding countermeasures for other variants of NTRUEncrypt with f = 1 + pFp, or
constructions with padding, is an interesting research directions.
One interesting observation that follows from our attack on NTRUSign is that the pertur-
bation process, which was introduced to improve the security of NTRUSign towards previous
attacks, does not improve the resistance of NTRUSign against this kind of fault attacks if the
norm-bound checking step can be skipped by the attacker. Another observation is that using
NTRUSign with a larger-security parameter, while improving the resistance against lattice based
attacks, does not necessarily improve the resistance against fault analysis attacks especially in
the cases where the attacker is able to precisely corrupt a small number of coefficients and is
able to skip the norm-bound checking step. Thus, when NTRUSign is deployed in environments
that are susceptible to this class of fault analysis attacks, implementing fault analysis counter-
measures, such as the two countermeasures developed in this work, is necessary to protect the
security of the system even if the largest-security parameters are utilized.
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Chapter 5
Application of Scan-based SCAs on
NTRUEncrypt Cryptosystems
5.1 Introduction
Scan-based Design-For-Test (DFT) [34] is a popular technique for validating the func-
tionality of integrated circuits during fabrication and providing on-chip debugging capabilities
in the field. When using this approach, all flip-flops in the circuit under test are tied to one or
more scan chain that enable scanning out their states using the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG)
boundary scan interface [93]. A JTAG interface is a special serial interface with the following
pins: TDI (Test Data In), TDO (Test Data Out), TCK (Test Clock), TMS (Test Mode Select),
and optional TRST (Test Reset). TMS selects between normal mode and test mode. TRST is
the reset signal for the test controller. During testing, test vectors can be scanned in via the TDI
pin, and flip-flops states can be scanned out via the TDO pin. As shown in Figure 5.1, a scan
flip-flop is a flip-flop with a Multiplexer (MUX) at the input. In normal mode, it works like a
normal flip-flop. In test mode, as shown in Figure 5.2, all scanned flip-flops are disconnected
from the combinational circuit and connected to each other in a scan chain where their contents
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Figure 5.2: An illustration for a scan chain
While scan-based DFT improves the quality of testing, it also introduces a powerful
side channel attacks against hardware implementations of cryptographic devices that utilize this
technique. Despite the fact that the internal structure of the scan chain is usually not known
to attackers, exploiting the information obtained from analyzing the scanned data allows crypt-
analysts to ascertain this structure and retrieve the secret key from the cryptographic hardware
devices that implement various cryptographic algorithms such as DES [192], AES [140, 193],
RSA [139], ECC [141], and stream ciphers [1, 120].
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the NTRUEncrypt algorithm [84, 87] is a pa-
rameterized family of lattice-based public key cryptosystems. In the past few years, the se-
curity of NTRUEncrypt against mathematical attacks had been analyzed by many researchers
(e.g., [95, 142]). Different classes of SCAs against NTRUEncrypt and their countermeasures
were also considered [13, 105, 119, 171].
In this chapter, we present a scan-based SCA against a hardware implementations of
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NTRUEncrypt. In general, all scan-based SCAs can be viewed as a kind of differential crypt-
analysis where attackers take advantage of the scan chains to observe the bit changes between
pairs of chosen plaintexts/ciphertexts and consequently, identify the secret keys. More pre-
cisely, scan-based attacks can be classified into two classes [167]: Constant Based Attacks
(CBAs) and Fixed-Hamming-Distance-based Attacks (FHDAs). CBAs take advantages of the
fact that in the encryption/decryption process, the contents of some special registers are inde-
pendent of the input. By using several different inputs and scanning out the contents at different
times of the cryptographic operation, the internal registers of the cryptographic device can be
easily identified. Then, by setting these registers to specific states through scan operations, the
complexity of the secret key recovery can be reduced. In FHDAs, several pairs of relevant plain-
texts/ciphertexts are applied and then, for each pair, the number of different bits in the output
are counted to recover the secret key.
Our attack can be seen as a type of FHDAs where we focus on determining the scan
chain structure of the polynomial multiplication circuit in the decryption algorithm and then
utilize the Hamming weight information of some particular registers, which can be obtained via
the JTAG interface, to efficiently retrieve all the coefficients of the secret key polynomial. An-
other contribution of this chapter is showing that existing NTRUEncrypt hardware architectures
that target low area implementations are easier to break using scan-based attacks compared to
architectures that target high speed implementations because of the different methods used to
perform the convolution multiplication in the decryption process in both approaches.
5.2 Hardware implementation options for NTRUEncrypt
Throughout the rest of the chapter, we focus on the NTRUEncrypt algorithm with the
widely used parameters: p = 3 and q in the form of 2n [84]. We assume that the attacker has
access to the high level timing diagram of the target hardware implementation and that the secret
key is stored in secure memory that cannot be accessed through the scan chain. We also assume
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that the attacker has direct access to the scan chains via the JTAG port or by breaking open the
package and directly probing the buried JTAG ports [34].
From the description of the encryption and decryption operations in section 4.2.1, it is
clear that the most time/area consuming step in both operations is the convolution multiplication
required to compute r(x)⋆h(x) and f(x)⋆e(x) during the encryption and decryption operations,
respectively.
While there are several hardware implementations for NTRUEncrypt (e.g., see [12, 13,
15,110,119,130]), the majority of these implementations focus on optimizing either the time or
the area required by theses convolution operations. In what follows, we focus on the decryption
process because it is the only relevant part for our cryptanalysis since the encryption module
does not contain any secret information.
For low area and low power implementations, which are viable for resource constrained
applications such as RFIDs and sensor nodes, the convolution multiplication, a = f ⋆ e mod q,
is usually performed in approximately N2 clock cycles [12, 110] as shown in Figure 5.3. In
this case, the computation for the coefficients of the polynomial a are done sequentially where
the coefficient ai, of size log2(q), is obtained after (i + 1) × N clock cycles, 0 ≤ i < N .
For example, a0 is calculated by accumulating (mod q) the results of serially multiplying e0 ×
f0, eN−1 × f1, eN−2 × f2, · · · , e1fN−1 into a register initialized to zero where each multiply-
and-add step is performed in one clock cycle.
For this kind of implementations, scan-based SCAs can be used to recover the secret
information in a straightforward way as follows: first, the attacker determines the locations of
the flip flops of the ciphertext register e in the scan chain output. This is done by analyzing the
bit differences between the scan chain outputs corresponding to the all zeroes ciphertext and the
N × log2(q) scan chain outputs corresponding to the ciphertext blocks with a (bit) Hamming
weight equal to one. This step is performed right after the ciphertext loading operation.
In the next step, the attacker loads a ciphertext e in which all coefficients are set to 1.
Since the value of a0 is computed sequentially, the intermediate values of a0 after the t
th clock
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j=0 fj × e(N−j) mod N mod q
=
∑t
j=0 fj mod q, 0 ≤ t < N.
Consequently, the attacker can recover the value of the secret key by scanning out the interme-
diate values of a0. Note that the attacker is able to determine the locations of the log2(q) bits
corresponding to a0. This is because the location of the bits corresponding to e are already de-
termined in the previous step and the only bits of the scan chain output that change in this step
would correspond to the a0 bits. This holds because the bits corresponding to ai, 0 < i < N
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Figure 5.3: A typical low area implementation of the convolution multiplication (f(x) ⋆ e(x))
in N2 clock cycles. For each 0 ≤ i < N , j varies from 0 to N − 1.
In hardware implementations of NTRUEncrypt that targets higher speed applications
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(e.g., see [13, 119, 130]), instead of storing all the coefficients of f , the locations of the non-
zero (2 × df − 1) coefficients are stored. This allows the convolution multiplication to be
performed, as shown in Algorithm 3 [15], in 2 × df − 1 steps instead of N
2 steps (see Figure
5.4). Since the number of non-zero coefficients, 2 × df − 1, is typically much smaller than N ,










0 ≤ ? < 2 × ?? + 1 











= ??[?] + ??[?] × ??	(mod	?) 
Figure 5.4: The convolution multiplication between the polynomials f(x) and e(x) in 2×df−1
clock cycles
Determining the corresponding locations of the register e in the scan chain output can be
performed using the same approach above, i.e., by loading different ciphertexts with a Hamming
weight equal to one and analyzing the output differences in the scan chain output corresponding
to these ciphertexts and the one corresponding to the all zero ciphertext. On the other hand,
determining the coefficients of the secret key polynomial, f , requires some deeper analysis
which will be developed though the rest of this chapter.
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Algorithm 3 Fast Convolution Algorithm [15]
1: INPUT: An array k of df+1 locations for +1 and df locations for -1 representing f ; e; N : the size
of f and e
2: OUTPUT: T = f ⋆ e mod q.
3: for 0 ≤ l < 2N do
4: Tl ←− 0
5: end for
6: for 1 ≤ t ≤ df + 1 do
7: for 0 ≤ l < N do
8: Tl+k[t] ←− Tl+k[t] + el
9: end for
10: end for
11: for df + 2 ≤ t ≤ 2df + 1 do
12: for 0 ≤ l < N do
13: Tl+k[t] ←− Tl+k[t] − el
14: end for
15: end for
16: for 0 ≤ l < N do
17: Tl ←− (Tl + Tl+N ) mod q
18: end for
5.3 The proposed scan-based attack
As mentioned above, when the convolution multiplication is implemented as shown in
Figure 5.4, a straightforward application of scan-based attacks to recover the full scan chain
structure will not work because of the large number of flip-flops connected in the scan chain.
Instead, in our attack, we focus on determining the relevant flip-flops in the scan chain structure
of the polynomial multiplication circuit. The main idea of our attack is to distinguish the register
T into two parts: TR and TL (the relevance of both parts will be explained below.) Then by single
stepping through the 2df + 1 clock cycles of the convolution multiplication, and by recording
the Hamming weight of TR and TL in each clock, the attacker can construct a system of linear
equations, with the potential positions of the non-zero elements of the secret key as unknowns.
This set of equations can be solved to obtain a set of possible keys. Then, the correct key can
be determined by verifying the correctness of the decryption operation for a known plaintext.
72
5.3.1 Summary of the attack
Conceptually, the steps of the attack can be summarized as follows:
1. Reset the chip and run it in the normal decryption mode to load an all zero ciphertext into
the register e. Resetting the circuit allows the attacker to rest all flip-flops (including those
that belong to the control circuit) into the same initial state before each attack step. This
is necessary in order to allow the attacker to calculate the differences in the Hamming
weight of the target registers before and after each attack step.
2. Switch to test mode and scan out the bit stream pattern.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 using all the N × log2(q) ciphertexts with a (bit) Hamming weight
equal to one and compare the output differences in the scan chain output corresponding
to these ciphertexts with the one corresponding to the all zeroes ciphertext. At the end
of this step, the attacker is able to determine the locations corresponding to the ciphertext
register, e, in the scan chain.
4. Load the chip with a ciphertext of all 1s in normal mode and clock the system one time to
evaluate T = f × e as shown in Algorithm 3.
5. Switch to test mode and scan out the bit stream pattern. In this case, the register T can be
distinguished into two parts: TR which contains all 1s and TL which contains 0s. Note that
while the attacker can identify the group of bits that belong to each of these two registers,
the attacker cannot determine the exact location of these bits within the registers.
6. Clock the system in normal mode
7. Switch to test mode and scan out the bit stream to calculate the Hamming weight of the
registers TR and TL.
8. Repeat steps 6-7 for (2 × df ) times and record the Hamming weights of the registers TR
and TL.
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9. Use the Hamming weights obtained above as an input to Algorithms 4 and 5 to form a set
of linear equations which can be solved to obtain the set of possible keys.
10. Determine the correct key by verifying the correctness of the decryption operation (using
any arbitrary known plaintext-ciphertext pair obtained using the public key encryption
process) for each of the keys obtained in step 9 above.
5.3.2 Recovering the secret key
For A = [a0, a1, ..., aN−1] and B = [b0, b1, ..., bN−1], ai, bi ∈ Zq, 0 ≤ i < N , the
following notation will be used throughout the rest of the chapter.
• Ai..j denotes the vector [ai, ai+1, ..., aj] of length j − i+ 1, 0 ≤ i < j.
•
−
Ai..j denotes the vector [(ai + (q − 1)) mod q, (ai+1 + (q − 1)) mod q, ..., (aj + (q −
1)) mod q]=[(ai − 1) mod q, (ai+1 − 1) mod q, ..., (aj − 1) mod q], 0 ≤ i < j.
•
+
Ai..j denotes the vector [(ai − (q − 1)) mod q, (ai+1 − (q − 1)) mod q, ..., (aj − (q −
1)) mod q] = [(ai + 1) mod q, (ai+1 + 1) mod q, ..., (aj + 1) mod q], 0 ≤ i < j.
To illustrate the above notation, consider the following example where A = [5, 0, 4, 2, 7]
and q = 0xF (in hexadecimal). Then
−
A1..3 = [0 + (q − 1)mod q, 4 + (q − 1) mod q, 2 +
(q−1) mod q] = [(0−1) mod q, (4−1) mod q)], (2−1) mod q = [0xE, 3, 1]. Similarly,
+
A0..2 = [5− (q−1) mod q, 0− (q−1) mod q, 4− (q−1) mod q] = [5+1, 0+1, 4+1] =
[6, 1, 5].
• A(t) denotes the value of the register A at time t.
• HW(·) denotes the Hamming weight of the enclosed argument.
• A|B denotes the vector obtained from the concatenation of A and B.
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Recovering the locations of the +1 elements in the secret key
As mentioned above, after determining the corresponding locations of the flip-flops cor-
responding to e in the scan chain, the attacker divides the flip-flops corresponding to the register
T into two parts: TL and TR which contain, after the first step of convolution multiplication,
all zeroes and all ones, respectively. Algorithm 4 is then used to determine the locations of the
+1 elements in f relative to the location of the first +1 element. More precisely, Algorithm 4
outputs an array whose tth element is equal to (k[t] − k[0]), 1 ≤ t < df + 1. As shown in the
algorithm, A and B, are used to simulate the intermediate values of TL and TR, respectively,
during the computation of T = f ⋆ e mod q. By examining the Hamming weight information
of TL and TR obtained from the scan chain output bit stream observed via the JTAG port, one
can derive information about k[t] − k[0] by going through all valid guesses values for k[t] (see
the variable j in Algorithm 4) and choosing the value for which the Hamming weight of A and
B match the corresponding one for TL and TR, respectively, at the corresponding time.
The steps of Algorithm 4 can be explained as follows. At t = 1, a ciphertext of all
ones is circularly shifted by k[0] elements and loaded into T (note that all ones at the bit level
corresponds to ei = q − 1.) This can be simulated by initializing Ai = 0 and Bi = q − 1,
0 ≤ i < N (lines 3-6). At t = 2, the ciphetext polynomial is circularly shifted by k[1]
elements and added to T . Thus (k[1] − k[0]) elements of A will change from 0 to q − 1 and





Bi..j (lines 14-15) are used to reflect these updates in A and B. Similarly,
depending on the value of k[2] − k[0], at t = 3, some elements of A change from q − 1 to
q − 2 and from 0 to q − 1 while some elements of B change from q − 2 to q − 3. This process





B0..N−j−1|BN−j..N−1, respectively, 1 ≤ j < N to simulate the above
process. For each j, we calculate HW(A0..N−j−1|
−
AN−j..N−1) − HW(A). This step is repeated
after incrementing j until the difference between these Hamming weights matches the value of
HW(TL
(t))−HW(TL
(t−1)), 2 ≤ t ≤ df +1. Then we set k[t]− k[0] = j, 1 ≤ t ≤ df +1. Note
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that while observing the changes in the Hamming weight of A is enough to allow Algorithm 4
to calculate the elements of S1, we still update B since it is needed by Algorithm 5 which is
used to determine all possible valid locations of the -1s in f .
Algorithm 4 Recovery of the locations of the +1s in the private key polynomial f
1: INPUT: HW(TL
(t)), 1 ≤ t ≤ df + 1.
2: OUTPUT: An array S1 where S1[t] = k[t]−k[0] and k[t] denotes the location of the tth +1 elements
in f , 1 ≤ t < df + 1.
3: for 0 ≤ i < N do
4: Ai ←− 0
5: Bi ←− q − 1
6: end for
7: j ←− 0
8: for 2 ≤ t ≤ df + 1 do
9: diff←− 0
10: while (diff ̸= HW(TL
(t))− HW(TL
(t−1))) do











16: S1[t− 1]←− j
17: end for
18: return S1, A,B
Recovering the locations of the -1 elements in the secret key
Algorithm 5 receives A, B, the set of +1 locations, S1, evaluated by Algorithm 4 and the
Hamming weights HW(TL
(t)) and HW(TR
(t)) obtained by analyzing the scan out bit stream,
df + 2 ≤ t ≤ 2 × df + 1. The algorithm operates in a way similar to Algorithm 4 except that,
each element in S2 represents a list of possible valid locations for the -1 elements as opposed to
a single element for the case of S1. Also, the content of register e is subtracted from register T ,
instead of addition in Algorithm 4 (see lines 11-15 in Algorithm 3.)
Lines 7-12 are used to initialize j to the starting values for our guesses for the location of
the t -1 element which correspond to k[t], df + 2 ≤ t ≤ 2df + 1. These steps can be explained
by noting that S2 represents the list of valid locations for the -1 elements and by the fact that
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k[t] > k[t−1] for df +2 ≤ t ≤ 2df +1 (in other words, the location of the t
th -1 element has to
be greater than the location of the (t− 1)th -1 element in f ). At t = df +2, j starts from 0 since
at this stage, the attacker cannot yet determine the exact value of k[0] (Also, the j = k[0] step is
skipped since two keys cannot be assigned to the same location.) More precisely, according to
the attacker’s knowledge at this step, 0 ≤ k[0] < N − S1[df ]. In lines 13-36, the updates of A
and B can follow two different paths depending on whether k[df +2] is less than or greater than
k[0] (i.e., whether the first non-zero element in f is +1 or -1). Lines 26-31 are used to determine
values of j that represent valid guesses for the location of the -1s to be appended to the list S2.
This is performed by comparing the Hamming weight of the simulated registers A and B with
the Hamming weight of TL and TR which can be calculated by observing the scan out data. In
particular, in lines 29-30, we add j to the list S2[t− df − 1], df +2 ≤ t ≤ 2df +1, as a possible
solution and update the values of A and B and append it to list L[t− df − 1].
Analyzing Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5 shows their run time complexity to be O(df ×
N) and O(df ×N
3), respectively.
Example 5.1 Consider a toy version of the NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem with parameters (N , p,
q, df ) = (7,3,16,2) and with a private key
f = [0,−1,−1, 1, 0, 1, 1].
Thus the locations of the non-zero coefficients of f are k = [3, 5, 6, 1, 2] where the first
df + 1 values denote the locations of +1s in the key and the last df values denote the locations
of -1s.
As explained above, the T register is initialized with all 0s before starting the convolution
computation of f ⋆ e mod q. At t = 1, T is loaded with a copy of the ciphertext after being
circularly shifted by k[0] = 3 coefficients according to Algorithm 3. Recall that the attacker
does not know k[0]. By scanning out the bit stream pattern via the JTAG port, the attacker can
distinguish T into TL and TR. Assume that the attacker observed the Hamming weights of of TL
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Algorithm 5 Recovery of the -1s locations in the private key polynomial f
1: INPUT: A, B and S1[df ] (from Algorithm 4), HW(TL
(t)) and HW(TR
(t)), df +2 ≤ t ≤ 2× df +1
2: OUTPUT: An array S2 of lists where S2[t− df ] is a list containing all estimated possible values for
k[t], df + 1 ≤ t < 2× df + 1.
3: for 0 ≤ k[0] < (N − S1[df ]) do
4: for df + 2 ≤ t ≤ 2× df + 1 do
5: i = 1
6: repeat
7: if (t = df + 2) then
8: j ←− 0
9: else
10: j ←− S2[t− df − 2][i] + 1
11: A|B ←− L[t− df − 2][i]
12: end if
13: while (j < N ) do
14: if (j ̸= k[0]) then




17: TempB ←− B0..k[0]−j−1|
+
Bk[0]−j..N−1
18: diff1 ←− HW(TempA)− HW(A)
19: diff2 ←− HW(TempB)− HW(B)
20: else






23: diff1 ←− HW(TempA)− HW(A)
24: diff2 ←− HW(TempB)− HW(B)
25: end if
26: if (diff1 = HW(TL
(t))−HW(TL




28: B ←− TempB
29: append A|B to L[t− df − 1]
30: append the location j to S2[t− df − 1]
31: end if
32: j ←− j + 1
33: else
34: j ←− j + 1
35: end if
36: end while
37: i = i+ 1





and TR as shown in Table 5.1 (Obviously, at t = 1, these Hamming weights are always going to
be 0 and (N × log2(q)), respectively). At t = 2, the register TL is changed by two coefficients
which implies that k[1]− k[0] = 2. While the attacker cannot associate the bits corresponding
to T in the scan chain output with the individual coefficients in TL and TR, the attacker can still
calculate the value of k[1]−k[0] by using Algorithm 4 which simulates the content of T = TL|TR
(using A and B) for different possible values of k([1]− k[0]) (the variable j in lines 7-17) until
the change in the Hamming weight of A, i.e., HW (A0..N−j−1|
−
AN−j..N−1) − HW (A) in the
simulation, matches HW(TL
(2)) − HW(TL
(1)) obtained from the scan out bit stream pattern.
Following the same strategy, the attacker recovers the distances between k[t] and k[0] for 2 ≤
t < df+1. In this example, the attacker recovers the set S1 = {k[1]−k[0] = 2, k[2]−k[0] = 3}
which defines the distances between the locations of the +1s in the key.












Figure 5.5 shows the input, output and intermediate computational results of Algorithm
4. To recover the locations of -1s in f , the attacker continues scanning out the bit stream pattern
and, using Algorithm 5, calculates HW(TL
(t)) and HW(TR





(t−1)) for df + 2 ≤ t ≤ 2× df + 1. In this
case and according to the obtained Hamming weights, different possibilities for these locations,
at each t, can be recovered. The attacker appends all these possible locations of the -1s in a set
of lists, S2. In particular, for this example, the attacker evaluates S2 = {k[3] = [1], k[4] = [2]}.
Then, the values in S1 represent the distances between the locations of +1s in the key in the
form (k[t]− k[0], 1 ≤ t < df + 1). The values of each element of S2 represent a list of possible
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locations of the -1s in the key. Enumerating all possible value for k[0], 0 ≤ k[0] < N − S1[df ]
(in this example, 0 ≤ k[0] < 4), the attacker is able to uniquely determine the correct key
locations {k[0] = 3, k[1] = 5, k[2] = 6, k[3] = 1, k[4] = 2}. Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 show the
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Figure 5.5: The computation steps in Algorithm 4 for Example 5.1
Because of the small value of N in the above example, the solution returned by Algo-
rithms 4 and 5 is unique. The following example illustrates the more general case (the calcula-
tions details are omitted because of space limitations).
Example 5.2 Consider a toy version of the NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem with parameters (N , p,
q, df ) = (11,3,32,3) and with a private key
f = [0,−1,−1, 1, 0,−1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1].
Assume that, based on the scan chain output bit stream observed via the JTAG port,
the attacker distinguished the register T into two parts TL and TR and recorded the Hamming
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?????
???????
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?        
1 0 0 0 0 F E F E E E E F 0 F 11 11?10=1 12?10=2 20 20?23=?3 16?23=?7 X 
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
 ? ? ? ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?        
2 0 0 0 0 F F F E E E E F F F 12 12?10=2 12?10=2 24 24?23=1 16?23=?7 X 
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
 ? ? ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ?        
3 0 0 0 0 0 F F E E E E E F F 8 8?10=?2 12?10=2 23 23?23=0 16?23=?7 X 
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
 ? ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ? ?        
4 0 0 0 1 0 F F E E E D E F F 9 9?10=?1 12?10=2 23 23?23=0 16?23=?7 X 
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
 ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ?        
5 0 0 1 1 0 F F E E D D E F F 10 10?10=0 12?10=2 23 23?23=0 16?23=?7 X 
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
 ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?        
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1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?        ????????
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
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???????
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 ? ? ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ?        
1 0 0 0 0 0 F F E E E E E F F 8 8?10=?2 12?10=2 23 23?23=0 16?23=?7 X 
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
 ? ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ? ?        
5 0 0 0 1 0 F F E E D D E F F 9 9?10=?1 12?10=2 23 23?23=0 16?23=?7 X 
 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??        
 ? ? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ? ? ?        
6 0 0 1 1 0 F F E E D D E F F 10 10?10=0 12?10=2 23 23?23=0 16?23=?7 X 
 
Figure 5.6: The computation steps in Algorithm 5 for Example 5.1
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If j <k[0] then 
 TempA=+A0..k?0?−j−1|A k?0?−j..N−1 
elsif j >k[0] 
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? ?F        ?F ?F ?F ?F ?F ?F ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ???????????????? ??? ? ???????? ???????? √?
??   ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Line 34?
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Line 
 20?32?
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Figure 5.7: The computation steps in Algorithm 5 for Example 5.1: Continued from Figure 5.6
Running Algorithm 4, the attacker recovers the set S1 = {k[1]− k[0] = 3, k[2]− k[0] =
6, k[3]−k[0] = 7} which defines the distances between the locations of the +1s in the key. Using
Algorithm 5, the attacker evaluates S2 = {k[4] = 1, k[5] = [2, 4], k[6] = [4, 5, 6]}. The values
in S1 represents the distances between the locations of +1s in the key in the form (k[t] − k[0],
1 ≤ t < df + 1) and the values of each element in S2 represents a list of possible locations
of the -1s in the key. Enumerating all possible value for k[0], 0 ≤ k[0] < N − S1[df ] (in this











If j <k[0] then 
TempA=+A0..k?0?−j−1|A k?0?−j..N−1 
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Figure 5.8: The computation steps in Algorithm 5 for Example 5.1: Continued from Figure 5.7
process to uniquely determine the correct key locations {k[0] = 3, k[1] = 6, k[2] = 9, k[3] =
10, k[4] = 1, k[5] = 2, k[6] = 5}.
5.4 Experimental Results
In order to verify the correctness of the proposed attack, we implemented the NTRU-
Encrypt decryption system with the convolution circuit depicted in Figure 5.4 using Synopsys
design compiler and inserted a scan chain using Synopsys test compiler. Using this implemen-
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4=df + 1 29 43
5=df + 2 31 33
6 31 23
7=2× df + 1 31 24
tation, we confirmed our ability to determine the scan chain structure and the Hamming weight
of TR and TL. The Hamming weights obtained from the ModelSim simulation were then used
as input to Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5 which were implemented using Python script. Ta-
ble 5.3 shows our simulation results for Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5 with 100 randomly se-
lected keys for NTRUEncrypt with parameters (N, p, q, df , dg, dr) = (167, 3, 128, 61, 20, 18),
(263, 3, 128, 50, 24, 16), and (503, 3, 256, 216, 72, 55) which correspond to the moderate, high,
and highest security parameters in [85]. As shown in the table, the average size of the list of
keys, returned by Algorithms 4 and 5, is given by ≈ 218, 224 and 264 for these three set of pa-





≈ 283, 2111 and
2285, respectively [85]. It should be noted that these relatively large values for the average were
dominated by some few cases where the size of the resulting key list were too large compared
to the other cases (also note the relatively small values of the median in Table 5.3). Figure 5.9
shows the histogram distribution for the results of our simulations obtained from 100 runs with
randomly generated keys for each N . From our data, and as can be deducted from Figure 5.9,
forN = 503, in 28% of the cases, the size of the key list was less than 240. As mentioned above,
the unique correct key can be determined by going through this list and verifying the correctness
of the decryption operation for a known plaintext. This off-line step does not require physical
access to the cryptographic device. It also does not require large memory space since the size
of the sets S1 and S2 (outputs from Algorithm 4 and 5) is limited to O(dfN). Also, since there
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Table 5.3: Average and median size of the list of suggested keys
N = 167 N = 263 N = 503
Average ≈ 217.98 223.28 263.52
Median ≈ 28.61 28.97 230.98
is no dependency between the different search paths, this exhaustive search step can be easily
parallelized. It should be noted that the overall complexity of the attack is dominated by the
complexity of Algorithm 5 and the complexity of going through the list of keys calculated by
Algorithms 4 and 5 since the number of steps required by the scan-in and scan-out operations is
negligible compared to these two steps.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a scan-based SCA to recover the NTRUEncrypt secret key.
By analyzing the Hamming weight of the scan chain output at carefully chosen clock cycles,
the attacker is able to efficiently recover the locations of the +1s and -1s of the secret key poly-
nomial. The presented attack clearly shows the need to utilize secure scan chains for hardware
implementations of NTRUEncrypt with the scan-based DFT feature.
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Figure 5.9: Histogram distribution for the size of the list of suggested keys
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Chapter 6
Cryptanalysis of Key Exchange Schemes
Based on Matrix Algebra
6.1 Introduction
Public-key cryptography [124] provides key exchange mechanisms in which secret keys
can be exchanged between users over insecure communication channels. These key exchange
mechanisms are usually based on number theory problems such as the discrete logarithm prob-
lem (DLP) [57], integer factorization [158] and elliptic curve DLP [26]. These systems require
a large number of arithmetic operations, which makes them hard to implement in most resource
constrained applications. To overcome this problem, key exchange protocols based on efficient
matrix algebra have been proposed (e.g., see [191]). Odoni et al. [147] introduced the discrete
logarithm problem for matrices over Fq and proposed a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
based on matrices. Menezes and Wu [125] reduced the discrete logarithm problem for matrices
to some discrete logarithm problems over small extensions of Fq. In what follows, we present a
cryptanalysis of three different key exchange schemes based on matrix algebra.
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6.2 Cryptanalysis of A´lvarez et al. key exchange scheme
Recently, A´lvarez et al. [5] proposed a key exchange scheme utilizing the non-abelian
group of block upper triangular matrices (see also [5, 7]). A´lvarez et al. claimed that one of
the main advantages of this scheme is the absence of big prime numbers, which yields faster
arithmetic operations and avoids the need for primality testing. Moreover, they also claimed
that the proposed scheme is very efficient since it employs fast exponentiation algorithms for
this type of matrices. In particular, by analyzing the order of the non-abelian group generated
by these matrices as a function of the security parameters (r, s, p), as well as the implementation
efficiency of these schemes, A´lvarez et al. concluded that their system with security parameters
(r = 2, s = 89, p = 2903) has better performance than the Diffie-Hellman scheme with a
similar level of security (key size of approximately 1024 bits).
In [187], Vasco et al. showed that breaking the A´lvarez scheme can be reduced to solving
a small set of discrete logarithm problems in an extension of the base field. Consequently, Vasco
et al. concluded that the A´lvarez scheme does not offer any computational advantage over the
original Diffe-Hellman key exchange scheme. While the presented results in [187] challenges
the efficiency claims made by A´lvarez et al. [5] by showing that working with the proposed
non-abelian group of block upper triangular matrices does not offer a computational advantage
over working in the base field, these results do not present a practical attack on the A´lvarez
scheme for the recommended size of the security parameters (see table 3 in [5]).
In this section, we show that breaking this scheme is equivalent to solving a set of
3(r+ s)2 consistent linear equations with 2(r+ s)2 unknowns in Zp, which renders this system
insecure for the suggested practical choices of security parameters. The rest of this context is
organized as follows. In section 6.2.1, we briefly describe some details of the A´lvarez et al. key
exchange scheme. The proposed attack is described in section 6.2.2.
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6.2.1 Description of the A´lvarez et al. key exchange scheme
In this section, we briefly review the relevant definitions and details of the A´lvarez et al.
key exchange scheme. For further details, the reader is referred to [5].
Let Matr×s(Zp) denote the set of matrices of size r × s with elements in Zp where p is a
prime number. Let Glr(Zp) denote the general linear group of invertible matrices of sizes r× r,








 : A ∈ Glr(Zp), B ∈ Gls(Zp), X ∈ Matr×s(Zp)

.









0 if h = 0∑h
i=1A













 be two elements of the setΘwith order
m1 andm2, respectively.




















The A´lvarez et al. key exchange scheme can be summarized as follows [5]
1. Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and two matrices M1, M2 ∈ Θ with large orders m1
andm2, respectively.
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2. Alice generates two random private keys1 l, m ∈ N such that 1 ≤ l ≤ m1 − 1, 1 ≤ m ≤







3. Alice sends C to Bob.
4. Bob generates two random private keys v, w ∈ N such that 1 ≤ v ≤ m1 − 1, 1 ≤ w ≤







5. Bob sends D to Alice.
6. The public keys of Alice and Bob are respectively the matrices C and D.












2 . It should be noted that


































1In [5], the symbols r, s were mistakenly used to simultaneously refer to both the security parameters and the
secret exponents chosen by Alice, in step 2 of the key exchange algorithm. In this context, to avoid any possible
confusion, we use r, s to refer to the system parameters and l,m to refer to the secret exponents chosen by Alice.
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Finally, Alice and Bob share the keyK = Ka = Kb.
6.2.2 The proposed attack
The above construction for M1 and M2 is used to guarantee a large order of the non-
abelian group generated by these matrices and to attain a fast exponentiation algorithm for this
type of matrices. On the other hand, our attack does not depend on the particular method by
which the matricesM1 andM2 are constructed. From the analysis provided in [5], we have
C = M l1M
m
2 ,
D = M v1M
w
2 .
Thus, despite the apparent complexity of the above key exchange scheme, when analyz-
ing its security, one can simply view it as follows
1. Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and two matricesM1,M2 ∈ Θ.
2. Alice sends C = M l1M
m
2 to Bob.
3. Bob sends D = M v1M
w
2 to Alice.
4. Both Alice and Bob calculate M l+v1 M
w+m
2 and extract the secret key using Equations
(6.1), (6.2).
In what follows, we show that, given the public matrices C andD, the attacker can easily
recover the secret key.
Lemma 6.1 LetW1 andW2 be two invertible matrices of dimension (r+s)×(r+s) that satisfy
W1M1 = M1W1 (6.3)
W2M2 = M2W2 (6.4)
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Proof: Using mathematical induction, it is easy to show that W1M1 = M1W1 and








2 W2, respectively. The












The above Lemma shows that while the attacker may not be able to recover the secrets







attacker can still recover the overall secret key agreed upon between Alice and Bob if she is
able to find any W1 and W2 that satisfy the above set of equations. This seemingly nonlinear
system of equations can be easily linearized as follows
From Equation (6.3), we have













1 M1 and Equation (6.5) byW
−1
1 D = W2. In other words, the
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attacker solves the system of equations given by




W−11 D = W2,
(6.6)
which corresponds to solving a set of 3(r+s)2 linear equations with 2(r+s)2 unknowns,
corresponding to the elements of W−11 and W2 over Zp. The following Lemma shows that the
attacker is always able to find a valid solution for Equation (6.6).
Lemma 6.2 The linear system of equations defined in Equation (6.6) is consistent.
Proof: The proof follows directly by noting that W1 = M
v
1 and W2 = M
w
2 is a valid
solution for this system of equations.
Remark 6.1 A closer look at the A´lvarez scheme reveals that it resembles the completely wrong
and insecure implementation of the Diffe-Hellman key exchange in which Alice and Bob agree
on g(x+y) = gx × gy instead of gxy = (gx)y = (gy)x, and hence it should be completely
abandoned. It is also interesting to note that the claimed efficiency of this system is also a
direct consequence of this mistake; the system uses matrix multiplication (e.g., see step 4 of the
algorithm description in section 3) instead of matrix exponentiation.
The following toy example illustrates the idea of the attack.





3 31 24 12 13
9 24 28 20 26
0 0 9 16 14
0 0 25 17 2






7 14 18 12 4
22 16 15 12 6
0 0 29 36 8
0 0 33 15 35
0 0 5 24 5







31 14 31 19 31
35 10 10 32 21
0 0 36 8 30
0 0 9 18 10
0 0 27 5 11


and sends it to Bob.





7 25 32 23 21
16 28 18 15 32
0 0 33 12 17
0 0 16 25 20
0 0 33 18 14


and sends it to Alice.
Thus we have







2 15 33 18 26
14 2 3 27 16
0 0 28 1 5
0 0 17 18 14




and the secret calculated by Alice and Bob is









5 14 24 21 19
22 14 32 29 12
0 0 4 20 21
0 0 26 8 0







20 17 2 20 31
30 16 34 31 24
0 0 9 4 6
0 0 36 10 16






19 33 31 31 13
6 33 18 21 18
0 0 22 16 11
0 0 30 9 13
0 0 15 7 18







2 15 33 18 26
14 2 3 27 16
0 0 28 1 5
0 0 17 18 14
0 0 11 13 5


= Ma = Mb.
It is obvious that the secret key is given by the upper right r × s = 2× 3 matrix ofW1CW2.
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6.3 Cryptanalysis of a key exchange protocol based on the
endomorphisms ring End(Zp × Zp2)
Climent et al. [40] identified the elements of the endomorphisms ringEnd(Zp×Zp2) [17]
with elements in a new set, denoted by Ep, of matrices of size 2× 2, whose elements in the first










 |a, b, c ∈ Zp and d ∈ Zp2














 (a1 + a2) mod p (b1 + b2) mod p
p(c1 + c2) mod p
















 (a1a2) mod p (a1b2 + b1d2) mod p
p(c1a2 + d1c2) mod p





















 ∈ Ep with a, b, c, u, v ∈ Zp. Then M is invertible if and only if
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a ̸= 0 and v ̸= 0, and in this case we haveM−1 =

 a−1 (−a−1bv−1) mod p
p[(−a−1cv−1) mod p] p[(ca−1b(v−1)2 − u(v−1)2 − ⌊vv
−1
p
⌋v−1) mod p] + v−1

 .
Climent et al. [40] proved that the ring End(Zp × Zp2) is isomorphic to the ring Ep.





≈ 1 for large p. (6.7)
Thus, for large values of p, almost all elements in Ep are invertible. During the last
decade, several cryptographic primitives using algebraic systems rather than traditional finite
cyclic groups or finite fields have been proposed (e.g., see [138, 183]). In this context, and by
trying to take advantage of matrix arithmetic, Climent et al. proposed a key exchange protocol
using polynomial functions over Ep defined by polynomials in Z[X]. In this section, we show
that this protocol is not secure. In particular, we show that this protocol can be broken by solving
a set of 10 consistent homogeneous linear equations in 8 unknowns over Zp2 . The rest of this
context is organized as follows. In section 6.3.1, we briefly describe some details of the Climent
et al. key exchange scheme. The proposed attack is described in section 6.3.2.
6.3.1 Description of Climent et al. key exchange scheme
For completeness, we briefly review the relevant details of the Climent et al. key ex-
change scheme. For further details, the reader is referred to [40].
Let f(X) = a0 + a1X + a2X
2 + ... + anX
n ∈ Z[X]. For an element M ∈ Ep, the
element
f(M) = a0I + a1M + a2M
2 + ...+ anM
n ∈ Ep
where I is the multiplicative identity of Ep. The key exchange protocol proposed in [40] can be
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summarized as follows
1. Alice and Bob agree on the public parameters r, s ∈ N andM,N ∈ Ep for a large prime
p.
2. Alice and Bob choose their private keys f(X) and g(X) ∈ Z[X], respectively.
3. Alice computes her public key PA = f(M)
rNf(M)s and sends it to Bob.
4. Bob computes his public key PB = g(M)
rNg(M)s and sends it to Alice.
5. Alice and Bob compute SA = f(M)
rPBf(M)
s and SB = g(M)
rPAg(M)
s respectively.
6. Finally, Alice and Bob share the secret key SA = SB.
6.3.2 The proposed attack













be two matrices in Ep such that
W1M = MW1 (6.8)
W2M = MW2 (6.9)
PBW2 = W1N. (6.10)
Then we have




Note that Wi, i = 1, 2, commutes with M implies that Wi commutes with f(M) and
consequently Wi commutes with f(M)
h for any h ∈ N. Also Wi commutes with M implies
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thatW−1i commutes withM (This follows by noting thatWiM = MWi ⇒ WiMW
−1
i = M ⇒
MW−1i = W
−1












It is easy to verify thatW1 = g(M)
r andW2 = g(M)
−s is a valid solution to the system
of equations in Lemma 6.3. Thus, this linear system of equations is consistent and consequently
the attacker is guaranteed to find at least one solution. In what follows we show how the attacker







Because of the structure of the elements in Ep, it is easy to verify that the equation
resulting from equating the top left element on both sides of the resulting matrices products
in Equation (6.8) does not add any constraints to the system of equations and hence it can be
eliminated (in other words, (a1m1 + pb1m3) ≡ (a1m1 + pm2c1) mod p is always satisfied for
all choices of a1 and b1). Consequently, Equation (6.8) leads to the following three equations:
a1m2 + b1m4 − b1m1 − d1m2 ≡ 0 mod p
p(c1m1 + d1m3 − a1m3 − c1m4) ≡ 0 mod p
2
p(c1m2 − b1m3) ≡ 0 mod p
2
(6.11)
with unknowns a1, b1, c1 ∈ Zp and d1 ∈ Zp2 .
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Similar argument applies to Equation (6.9) (note, however that Equation (6.10) leads to
4 equations). The solution for the above system of equations can be obtained by solving it over
Zp2 and then reducing the obtained solution for ai, bi and ci modulo p, i = 1, 2 (recall that, for
any multivariate polynomial f , f(x1, · · · , xn) ≡ 0 mod p
2 ⇒ f(x1, · · · , xn) ≡ 0 mod p.)
Thus the solution for the system of 3 + 3 + 4 = 10 equations corresponding to Lemma
6.3 can be obtained by solving all equations over Zp2 and then reducing the obtained solution
for ai, bi and ci modulo p, i = 1, 2.
Based on our experimental results, this system of equations is always under-determined
and many solutions exist forW1 andW2. Choosing any solution such thatW2 is invertible leads
to the right key. Note that for large p, which is the case of interest for this cryptosystem, our
experimental results confirm this condition and practically holds for almost all valid solutions
(also see Equation (6.7)). In what follows, we illustrate our attack using the same toy example
that was provided in [40] to explain the steps of the protocol.












Then, Alice chooses her secret key as f(X) = 3 + 3X + 9X2 + 5X3 ∈ Z[X] and Bob chooses
his secret key as g(X) = 9 + 6X + 5X2 ∈ Z[X]. Thus we have





























and sends it to Alice. Alice computes her secret key SA = f(M)
3PBf(M)
5 and Bob computes
his secret key SB = g(M)
3PAg(M)
5 to obtain











8 9 0 3 0 0 0 0
77 0 22 44 0 0 0 0
0 77 88 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 3 2 0 8
0 0 0 0 44 0 99 77
0 0 0 0 0 44 33 0
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
3 4 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 110 77 110 0 66 0































and then reducing the obtained solution for ai, bi and ci, i = 1, 2, modulo p. Solving this system
















41z1 + z2 mod 11
3z1 + 65z2 mod 11
7z1 + 5z2 + 11z3 mod 11
43z1 + 4z2 mod 121
74z1 + 111z2 mod 11
99z1 + 88z2 mod 11
11z4 mod 11
8z1 + 12z2 mod 121


where z1, z2, z3, z4 can assume any arbitrary values in Z121. The attacker chooses any random
values for z1, z2, z3, z4 such thatW2 is invertible (which happens with probability ≈ 1 for large
values of p). In this example, suppose that the attacker randomly chooses [z1, z2, z3, z4]
T =
[1, 1, 10, 7]T , then we have [a1, b1, c1, d1, a2, b2, c2, d2]










































 = SA = SB.
6.4 Cryptanalysis of a GL(r,Zn)-based Public Key System
In [175], Salvin presented a key exchange protocol using matrices in the general linear
group, GL(r,Zn), where n is the product of two distinct large primes. The system is fully
specified in the United States patent number 7346162 issued in 2008. In the patent claims,
Salvin argued that the best way to break this system is to factor n. Furthermore, for efficiency
reasons, it was suggested to choose r = 2. In this section, we show that this cryptosystem can be
trivially broken by solving a consistent set of r2 homogenous linear equations in 2r unknowns
over Zn. The rest of this context is organized as follows. In section 6.4.1, we briefly describe
some details of the Salvin’s key exchange scheme. The proposed attack is described in section
6.4.2.
6.4.1 Description of Salvin’s key exchange scheme
In this section, we briefly review the relevant details of Salvin’s key exchange protocol.
Let GL(r,Zn) denote the General Linear group of invertible square matrices of rank r and
elements in Z mod n. To establish a shared secret key K between a sender and a receiver, the
scheme proceeds as follows [175]
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1. The receiver chooses two distinct large primes, p and q, and calculates n = p× q.
2. The receiver generates two randommatrices,A and C ∈ GL(r,Zn), such thatAC ̸= CA,
i.e., A and C do not commute.
3. The receiver calculates a matrix B ∈ GL(r,Zn) such that B = CAC.
4. The receiver generates a matrix G which commutes with C, i.e., GC = CG.
5. The receiver publishes A, B, G, n, r as the public key and keeps p, q and the matrix C as
the secret key (note that only C is used in the decryption process).
6. The sender uses the public matrix G and generates a secret matrix D ∈ GL(r,Zn) such
that GD = DG.
7. The sender generates the secret key K ∈ GL(r,Zn) using the matrices B, D such that
K = DBD.
8. The sender generates the matrix E ∈ GL(r,Zn) using the public matrix A such that
E = DAD and sends it to the receiver.
9. The receiver retrieves the secret key K ∈ GL(r,Zn) by calculating K = CEC. Finally,
the sender and receiver share the keyK = DBD = CEC.
In step 4 of the above protocol, the matrix G is generated by one of the following two
methods
G = Ck (6.12)







where ai are integers randomly generated in Zn with at least one ai ̸= 0 for i > 0 and C
0 = I .
Using the fact that powers of a matrix commute, the matrix D is also constructed by one of the








where k′ and bi, i = 0, · · · , r−1, are generated in the same way as k and ai. For justification of
the above choice of parameters (e.g., why k has to be even), the reader is referred to the security
analysis in [175] where it is shown that recovering C for such choice of parameters is equivalent
to factoring n.
6.4.2 The proposed attack
Most of the security argument in [175] is based on the fact that recovering the secret
matrices C and D from the public parameters is hard. In here, we show that the cryptanalyst
can recover the overall secret key, K, agreed upon between the sender and receiver without
recovering any of these two matrices. The main idea of the attack is based on the following
Lemma.




i, bi ∈ Zn, E = DAD, and K = DBD for arbitrary matrices A, B and G in











Proof: The proof follows by noting that
W1A = BW2 ⇒
DW1AD = DBW2D
From Equation (6.15), and given the construction of D, we have WiD = DWi, i = 1, 2.
Consequently
DW1AD = DBW2D ⇒
W1DAD = DBDW2 ⇒




It is straightforward to verify thatW1 = C andW2 = C
−1 is a valid non-trivial solution
for the homogeneous system of equations defined by Lemma 6.4. Thus despite the fact that
the number of unknowns in this homogenous system of linear equations, 2r2, is less than the
number of equations, 3r2, this system of equations is consistent and the attacker is guaranteed
to find a non-trivial (i.e., non-zero) solution forW1 andW2.
The complexity of the system of equations in Lemma 6.4 (i.e., number of unknown and










where ui, vi ∈ Zn. This form guarantees that the condition in Equation (6.15) is always satisfied





i = 0 (6.18)
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with 2r unknowns and r2 equations. In what follows we prove that this reduced system of
equations is also consistent.
Lemma 6.5 For any matrixH ∈ GL(r,Zn), and an integer powerm,H





i, hi ∈ Zn.
Proof: The proof follows by recursively applying Cayley Hamilton theorem [14], which
states that every square matrix over any commutative ring satisfies its own characteristic equa-
tion, and by noting that the characteristic of H has degree r.
Since G is constructed according to Equation (6.12) or Equation (6.13), Lemma 6.5












By noting that Lemma 6.5 also implies that C−1 can be expressed in the same form as
W2, the system in Equation (6.18) is consistent and has at least one non-trivial solution (W1 = C
andW2 = C
−1). In fact, our experimental results show that the rank of this system of equations
is usually less than 2r, i.e., it is under-determined and many solutions exist for W1 and W2.
Choosing any solution such that W2 is invertible leads to the right key. For a large n, which
is the case of interest for this cryptosystem, this condition practically holds for almost all valid
solutions of ui, vi, i = 0, · · · , r−1 excluding the trivial all zeroes solution. Using random p and
q of size 512 bits, we were able to recover the key in all the 1000 experiments that we conducted
for each r = 2, 3 · · · , 10 and we did not encounter any case corresponding to a non-invertible
W2. The following toy example illustrates the idea of our attack.
Example 6.3 Let r = 2, p = 13, q = 17, and n = p × q = 221. The receiver generates two













and verifies that AC ̸= CA. Then the receiver calculates

















which ensures that GC = CG. The receiver publishes n, A, B, and G as the public key and
keeps the other parameters secret. The sender generates a matrixD such thatDG = GD using

























Given the public parameters and E, the attack proceeds as follows. First, the attacker
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 u1 + 44 u2 108 u2









 v1 + 44 v2 108 v2
7 v2 v1 + 173 v2


Thus the system of linear equations in (6.16) can be expressed as
W1A− BW2 = 0⇒

16 76 1 138
173 190 45 158
207 121 89 113





















By solving this system of linear equations, the attacker obtains u1 = 34z, u2 = 199z,
v1 = 106z, and v2 = z where z can be set to any arbitrary value in Zn. To avoid the trivial
































In the first part of this chapter, we showed that A´lvarez et al. key exchange scheme is
insecure for all suggested practical choices of the security parameters (r, s, p). Our attack is also
directly applicable to the new system recently proposed by A´lvarez et al. in [6]. As mentioned
above, our attack does not depend on the particular method by which the involved matrices are
generated, and hence the idea of linearization used in this chapter can be applied to a wider class
of similar key exchange schemes.
In the second part, we showed that the key exchange protocol proposed by Climent et
al. is not secure. In fact, Climent’s scheme can be seen as a partial generalization of Stickel’s
key agreement scheme [178] which was broken by Shpilrain in [168] (see also [134,135,177]).
In particular, Shpilrain [168] deployed the same linearization approach used in our attack and
suggested to use non-invertible matrices to foil such linear algebra attacks and to repair Stickel’s
scheme but his proposal was also broken [134]. The fact that there are so few non-invertible
elements in Ep is a weakness of the scheme since it makes the attacker’s job easier. It should
also be noted that Stickel’s scheme is only an instance of the group Diffie-Hellman scheme [37]
which generalizes the original Ko-Lee et al. braid group based protocol [114]. Later on, several
braid groups were suggested as platform groups. Linear algebra attacks on these braid-based
schemes using the same techniques were also deployed (e.g., see [39, 92, 98, 118]).
Finally, we showed that key exchange scheme proposed in the US patent number 7346162
is completely insecure. In particular, while the attacker is not able to recover the secret parame-
ters chosen by the sender and receiver, the attacker can easily fully recover the secret key agreed
upon between the sender and receiver by solving r2 linear equations in 2r unknowns over Zn.
For the suggested choice of the parameter r = 2, this corresponds to solving 4 linear equations
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in 4 unknowns. It is interesting to note that the effort required by the attacker to break this
system, for any r, is less than the effort required by the sender during the key exchange process.
To our knowledge, the majority of published matrix-based cryptosystems fall into the same trap
and base the security argument on the inability of the cryptanalyst to recover some secret pa-
rameters. However, as shown in our work, this argument does not ensure the security of these
schemes because attackers might be able to recover the overall secret key without recovering
the individual components (e.g., let Z = XY . Then being able to find Z does not mean that
we are able to recover X and/or Y . Conversely, proving that one cannot find X or Y does not
imply that one cannot find Z given the availability of other information about Z).
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Research
Directions
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
This section briefly summarizes the accomplished work and the major contributions of
our thesis. In chapters 1, 2, the essential background, mathematical assumptions and motivation
for this work were presented.
In chapter 3, we modeled the problem of key recovery of the AES-128 key schedules
from its corresponding decayed memory images as a Boolean SAT problem and solved it us-
ing CryptoMiniSat. Our experimental results confirm the versatility of our proposed approach
which allows us to efficiently recover the AES-128 key schedules for large decay factors. The
presented method can be extended in a straightforward way to AES-192, AES-256 and other
ciphers with key schedules that can be presented as a set of Boolean equations and, hence, lend
themselves naturally to SAT solvers.
In chapter 4, we presented a fault analysis attack against the original variant of NTRUEn-
crypt. Our attack does not work against more recent variants of NTRUEncrypt where f = 1+pF
for ternary or binary polynomial F since the bijection between Fp and f does not exist in these
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variants. We also presented different techniques for strengthening the resistance of NTRUEn-
crypt hardware implementations against fault attacks. We provided a comparison between these
different techniques in terms of their error detection capabilities as well as area and throughput
overheads. We also provided FPGA implementation results for these approaches. One inter-
esting observation that follows from our attack on NTRUSign is that the perturbation process,
which was introduced to improve the security of NTRUSign against previous attacks, does not
improve the resistance of NTRUSign against this kind of fault attacks if the norm-bound check-
ing step can be skipped by the attacker. Another observation is that using NTRUSign with a
larger-security parameter, while improving the resistance against lattice based attacks, does not
necessarily improve the resistance against fault analysis attacks especially in the cases where
the attacker is able to precisely corrupt small number of coefficients and is able to skip the
norm-bound checking step.
In chapter 5, we presented a scan-based SCA on NTRUEncrypt hardware implementa-
tions that employ scan-based DFT techniques. By analyzing the Hamming weight of the scan
chain output at carefully chosen clock cycles, the attacker is able to efficiently recover the lo-
cations of the +1s and -1s of the secret key polynomial. The presented attack clearly shows the
need to utilize secure scan chains [74] for hardware implementations of NTRUEncrypt with the
scan-based DFT feature.
Finally, in chapter 6, we showed that the three key exchange schemes proposed by
A´lvarez et al. [8], Climent et al. [40], and Keith Salvin [175] are completely insecure. The
presented results show the difficulty of designing efficient key agreement schemes based on
matrices.
7.2 Future works
In what follows we list some topics of interest for future extension of our research.
• Recent advances in the field of leakage-resilient cryptography (e.g., see [2, 9, 36, 127]) is
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concerned with the design of cryptographic primitives resistant to arbitrary SCAs. The
main assumption used in all these works is that, while an attacker can repeatedly and
adaptively learn information about the secret key, the overall amount of such information
is bounded by some parameter. Several new cryptographic primitives are being designed
using such theoretical assumption but no concrete engineering methodology to guarantee,
or even measure, this information leakage bound has been considered. The development
of methods and techniques that achieve bounded leakage grantee is certainly a very chal-
lenging and interesting research direction.
• Post-quantum cryptography refers to research on cryptographic primitives, usually public-
key cryptosystems, that are not breakable using quantum computers. One possible (long
term) theoretical research project is to investigate the existence of quantum algorithms
that may help speed up the cryptanalysis of ciphers currently included in the list of post-
quantum algorithms (e.g., lattice based cryptosystems including NTRU, code-based cryp-
tosystems [123, 144] and systems based on multivariate-quadratic-equations [91]). An-
other research direction is exploring the application of different types of SCAs to these
algorithms.
• Examples of current side channels include timing information, power consumption, elec-
tromagnetic leaks, acoustic leaks, and fault analysis. It is not hard to argue that other side
channel might be explored in future research but coming up with a new concrete example
for such channels is the real challenge.
• The security of key exchange schemes that are based on braid groups [113, 114] is still
not very well understood. Exploring different cryptanalytic techniques against this class
of group-based cryptography is an interesting research direction.
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Appendix A
An FPGA Implementation of the
NTRUEncrypt Cryptosystem
In this appendix, we present an architecture that offers different area-speed trade-off for
NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem and analyze its performance. We utilize the statistical properties
of the distance between the non-zero elements in the polynomials involved in the encryption
and decryption operations. An FPGA prototype for the proposed design is also presented.
A.1 Hardware implementation of the NTRUEncrypt cryp-
tosystem
In what follows, we assume that at the beginning of the encryption operation, the public
key h(x) ∈ Rq is loaded into the chip through N parallel I/O PINS in TLd(h) = log2(q) clock
cycles. Similarly, for each plaintextm(x) ∈ Rp, an ephemeral key r(x) ∈ τ(d, d)will be loaded
in Tld(r) = ⌈log2(3)⌉ clock cycles and m(x) will be loaded in TLd(m) = ⌈log2(p)⌉ clock cycles.
Furthermore, Top(e) = log2(q) clock cycles will be required to output the ciphertext e(x) ∈ Rq
using N parallel I/O PINS.
From the description of the encryption and decryption operations in section 4.2.1, it
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is clear that the most time consuming part in both operations is the convolution product, Tconv,
required to compute r(x)⋆h(x) and f(x)⋆e(x) during the encryption and decryption operations,
respectively.
In general, the convolution product a(x)⋆b(x) requiresN2 multiplications and additions
where each of the ck terms, k = 0 · · ·N − 1, can be evaluated in one clock cycle using a
shift, multiply and add operation. However, because of the ternary nature of both f(x) ∈
τ(d+ 1, d) and r(x) ∈ τ(d, d), these convolution can be evaluated without any multiplications.
Furthermore, the time required to load h can be ignored when encrypting a large number of
blocks. This is because h is loaded only once into the chip and remains unchanged throughout
the encryption process. Hence, and by ignoring the few extra clock cycles required by the
control circuity, a straightforward implementation of the encryption algorithm would require
approximately
TLd(r) + TLd(m) + Tconv + Top(e) =
⌈log2(p)⌉ + ⌈log2(p)⌉ + N + log2(q)
clock cycles to encrypt each plaintext block.
On the other hand, d is usually much smaller than N . For example, for NTRU with
parameters (N, p, q) = (251, 3, 128), we have d = 36, i.e., the number of non-zero coefficients
in r(x) is 72 [145, 153]. Thus if the locations of these non-zero elements are loaded into the
chip, together with one bit indicating the value of each coefficient (i.e., 1 or -1), then Tconv can
be significantly reduced from N to 2d operations. To simplify the control circuity, we assume
that the jth-bits of the locations of the non-zero elements in r, j = 1, · · · ⌈log2(N)⌉ are loaded
in one clock cycle. Thus we have Tld(r) = ⌈log2(N)⌉+ 1 and hence the number of clock cycles
required to implement the encryption operation will be reduced to
TLd(r) + TLd(m) + Tconv + Top(e) =
(⌈log2(N)⌉+ 1) + ⌈log2(p)⌉ + (2d) + log2(q).
This reduction in Tconv, however, requires the availability of a hardware circuity that can
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be used to perform an arbitrary number of shifts, up to N − 2d, for the h(x) coefficients in one
clock cycle, e.g., a Barrel shifter. However, implementing ⌈log2(q)⌉N -bit Barrel shifters would
require a prohibitively large hardware.
A considerable reduction in this hardware complexity can be achieved if we only require
the shifter to be able to shift the coefficients in h(x) by a relatively small number of locations,
s << N , in each clock cycles.
Figure A.1 shows a typical implementation of such a circuit that can circularly shift its
N bit inputs by up to s bits in one clock cycle.
Let di, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d, denote the location of the i
th non-zero element in r(x). For con-
venience of notation, we set d0 = 0. Then the number of clock cycles required to evaluate the








Since these non-zero coefficients are distributed uniformly across the N terms of the
corresponding polynomials, then, on average, we have
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   y0        y1        yN-2        yN-1     
Figure A.1: Example of (N, s)-shifter
Throughout the rest of the appendix we focus on the (251, 3, 128)-version of NTRU.
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Figure A.2 shows how the average value of Tconv(s) decreases with s, for 1000, 000 randomly
generated polynomials r(x) ∈ τ(36, 36). Figure A.3 shows the number of slices required to
implement this (251,s)-shifter. From both figures, it is clear that choosing s > 8 offers a small































Maximum possible shifts (s)
Figure A.2: Average value of Tconv(s)
Figures A.4 and A.5 show the histogram of Tconv(s) for 1000, 000 randomly generated
r(x) ∈ τ(36, 36) for s = 4, 8 respectively. The average, minimum and maximum values for
Tconv(s=4) are 96.4, 85 and 106, respectively. The corresponding values for Tconv(s=8) are 76.85,
72, and 85.
Similar argument applies in optimizing the decryption algorithm except that calculating
mod p in the final decryption step is non trivial. In this work, we investigated two methods to
calculate the mod p operation. The first method is using the Mersenne primes algorithm [189].
In this method, a(x) can be split into sections each of length log2(p + 1) bits which can be
added to produce a(x) mod p (see Algorithm 6). The second method is to use Look-Up Tables
(LUTs). The LUT approach is relatively efficient in case of small p. Note that choosing q in the


























Maximum possible shifts (s)
Figure A.3: The number of slices for (251, s)-shifter
Algorithm 6Modular reduction using Mersenne primes algorithm
INPUT: an integer a, a Mersenne prime p
OUTPUT: b = a mod p
b = a
while b > p do
Split b into sections ci | ci−1 | · · · | c1 | c0 each of length log2(p+ 1) bits.
b = ci + ci−1 + · · ·+ c1 + c0.
end while
The targeted hardware platform for our implementation is the xcv1600e-8-fg860 FPGA
using Xilinx ISE 9.1i as the Synthesis, Translation, Mapping, Place and Route File Generation
tool. The control unit for our encryption/decryption engine is implemented using a Finite State
Machine Data-path (FSMD) model. Simulations were conducted using the ISE model and
implemented using VHDL. This ensures the performance was inaccurate representation of the
actual FPGA.
Table A.1 shows the implementation results for the encryption-decryption engine using
the naı¨ve approach for polynomial multiplication. Table A.2 shows the corresponding results























Number of Clk cycles
Figure A.4: Histogram of Tconv(s=4)
increased from 51.22 to 134 Mbps, i.e., by about 161.62%, when using the Mersenne primes al-
gorithm and from 51.22 to 129 Mbps, i.e., by 151.85% when using the LUT method. Similarly,
for decryption, the average throughput increased from 51.81 to 143.99 Mbps, i.e., by 177.92%
when using the Mersenne primes algorithm and from 51.81 to 138.6 Mbps, i.e., by 167.52%,
when using the LUT method. On the other hand, the area cost has increased from 8973 to 13028
slices, i.e., by 45.19% when using the Mersenne primes algorithm and from 8648 to 12472, i.e.,
by about 44.22% when using the LUT method.
Similarly, for s = 8, the average encryption throughput increased by about 216.83% and
the average decryption throughput increased by about 241.75%. This occurs at the expense of
about 60%-66% increase in the number of slices.
It should be noted that the implementation presented here is susceptible to timing analy-
sis. It is interesting to explore how to modify it in a way that eliminates this weakness without



















Number of Clk cycles
Figure A.5: Histogram of Tconv(s=8)
Table A.1: Implementation results using the naı¨ve polynomial multiplication algorithm
Mersenne algorithm LUTs
Device components report
# of Slices 8973 8648
# of Slice FFs 4922 4922
# of 4-input LUTs 16273 15913
# of Roms (128x2-bits) - 251
# of IOBs 506 506
Timing report
Clk Freq.(MHz) 54.08 54.08
Throughput(Mbps) 51.22 Enc., 51.81 Dec.
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Table A.2: Implementation results using the proposed approach for s = 4 and s = 8
s = 4 s = 8
Mersenne LUTs Mersenne LUTs
algorithm algorithm
Device components report
# of Slices 13028 12472 14406 14352
# of Slice FFs 5424 4838 5469 5160
# of 4-input LUTs 24360 21654 27216 27292
# of Roms (128x2-bits) - 251 - 251
# of IOBs 579 579 579 579
Timing report
Clk Freq.(MHz) 61.61 59.31 61.61 62.33
Avg. Throughput Enc. 134.00 129.00 161.34 163.22
(Mbps) Dec. 143.99 138.6 176.03 178.09
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Appendix B
Enhanced Implementation of the
NTRUEncrypt Algorithm Using Graphics
Cards
B.1 Introduction
A Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) is a dedicated hardware for rendering graphics on
devices such as personal computers, workstations, game consoles and embedded systems. State
of the Art technologies made it possible to combine multiple GPUs in a single machine and
hence achieving an affordable level of parallel processing. One of the main differences be-
tween GPUs and CPUs is that, in general, a CPU is optimized for executing high performance
sequential code and hence the majority of its transistors are dedicated for flow control and
branch prediction. On the other hand, a GPU has a more parallel nature and the majority of
its transistors are dedicated for computation. This is because of the characteristics of its target
applications. During the past few years, the power of GPUs have been increasing at a higher rate
than that of CPUs. Consequently, general purpose computing on GPUs, i.e., the use of GPUs
to accelerate the computations of different algorithms, has become a trend in parallel comput-
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ing and played an important role in developing faster implementations for many algorithms in
different areas. Because of their inherent computational complexity, encryption techniques are
good candidates to benefit from the affordable high level of parallelism available on current
GPUs. This is because many cryptographic algorithms show good characteristics for data par-
allel processing such as high computation intensity and independent work loads. Furthermore,
security is becoming increasingly important and there is a great demand to secure data in all
phases of its life cycle from communication to active or archived storage. This trend requires
increased processing power which can be met by a combination of standard CPUs and GPUs
acting as cryptographic accelerators. This is possible because GPUs are now ubiquitous and,
unless involved in intensive graphics processing, their computational power are under-utilized
most of the time.
Several researchers have explored the potential to use this available GPU power in a role
similar to existing hardware cryptographic accelerators. In symmetric key cryptography, sev-
eral works (e.g., [43, 73, 122, 151, 159]) have reported different GPU implementations for the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). A very fast GPU implementation for the Korean ARIA
block cipher was achieved by Yung et al. [121] where they reached an encryption throughput of
4.8 Gbps. In asymmetric key cryptography, R. Szerwinski et al. [179, 180] exploited the power
of GPUs to speed up the computations of expensive operations such as modular exponentiation
for RSA and DSA and point multiplication for ECC. They obtained 813 modular exponentiation
per second for RSA and DSA-based systems with 1024 bit integers and 1412 point multiplica-
tions per second for ECC over P-224 NIST elliptic curves. A fast GPU implementation for
one of the NIST SHA-3 hash function candidates, Blue Midnight Wish (BMW), was presented
and analyzed in [149]. A GPU implementation for NTRU was also given in [76] where, using
a modern 1.2 GHz GTX280 GPU, a throughput of up to 200,000 encryptions per second was
reached at a security level of 256 bits. This gives a theoretical data throughput of 47.8 MB/s
(see also [15, 102] for other software and hardware implementations of NTRUEncrypt).
In this appendix, we investigate different implementation options for the NTRU encryp-
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tion on the NVIDIA GTX275 GPU. Using the Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA)
framework, our implementation achieves more than 351,000 parallel encryption operations per
second for NTRU with 256 bits security level (parameter set (N, q, p) = (1171, 2048, 3)) which
corresponds to an encryption throughput of about 77.21 MB/s.
B.2 The CUDA framework
Early attempts to use GPUs in cryptography were not very encouraging due to their
previously poor suitability to the problem space, especially, the lack of integer processing sup-
port. Furthermore, GPU programming was challenging for those not familiar with graphics.
Nowadays, high level language libraries that support parallel operations on GPUs have been
developed by the main manufacturers of GPUs and are widely available [33, 41, 137, 164]. In
what follows, we briefly summarize the thread organization and memory model of the Compute
Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) [146] framework developed by NVIDIA.
B.2.1 Thread organization and memory model
The CUDA framework defines normal C like functions called kernels. Typical candidates
for a kernel are functions that are executed many times but on multiple independent data. An
execution configuration is used to specify the number of times the function should be executed
as threads on the GPU and how the threads are organized. To manage the large number of
threads executed, CUDA uses a thread hierarchy to identify and organize the threads. Unique
coordinates are used to distinguish threads that execute the same function. As shown in Figure
B.1, for every launch, the threads are lined up in a grid which is divided into a two level hierarchy
of thread blocks and threads identified by coordinates called blockIdx and threadIdx which are
assigned to them by the CUDA runtime system. These coordinates are accessible in the kernel
to identify the different threads. The threads within a thread block can be organized in a one,
two or three-dimension. In one kernel launch, a dimension in the grid cannot exceed 65535 and
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__global__ void kernel (R, h, M, C) 
{ 





{ . . . 
memory copy from CPU to GPU; 
 
dim3grid (x, 1);  
dim3 block (y, 1); 
kernel <<< grid, block>>>( R, h, M, C); 
 
memory copy from GPU to CPU; 
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Figure B.1: The CUDA programming model
the size of a thread block is limited to 512. When the grid of thread blocks are launched, each
thread block is assigned to an arbitrary Streaming Multiprocessor (SM). Every thread within the
thread block is computed on the same SM. To schedule the threads, the SMs use a technique
that NVIDIA calls Single-Instruction Multiple-Thread (SIMT). It is similar to Single Instruction
Multiple Data (SIMD) but SIMT specifies the execution and branching behavior of each thread.
The SMs are allocated thread blocks, and the SIMT unit splits the threads into groups of 32
threads called warps. Each warp consists of threads with consecutive increasing thread IDs
with the first warp of a thread block containing thread ID 0-31. For every clock cycle, the SM
chooses a warp that is ready to execute for scheduling, and hands each Streaming Processor
(SP) a thread.
While Kernels run as threads on the GPU, the memory copying and the execution con-
figuration is done by the CPU (the host). This separates the code into code executed on the CPU
and code executed on the GPU. While both the host and the GPU manage their own memory
space, data can be copied between them. Figure B.2 shows the memory model in CUDA [146].
Global Memory (GM) is the most frequently used memory space since it is the only space that
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Figure B.2: The CUDA memory model
can be both read and written by both the CPU and the GPU. Constant and texture memory is
read-only on the GPU, and is setup from the host for read-only data. The constant and tex-
ture memory is located in the same physical memory (DRAM) as global memory, but uses the
texture unit in combination with a cache available to each SM to increase speed up reads from
the memory spaces. Each SM has an 8 kB working set of constant and texture memory that
is cached, which makes it useful for algorithms using data patterns that are read-only. Global
memory, texture and constant memory can be accessed from any thread on the grid. Shared
memory (SH) is the only memory space that is available on the actual GPU core and it is local
to each SM, i.e., it can be accessed only within a thread block. Since the shared memory is very
quick, it is optimal for sharing data across a thread block, or for performing computation before
writing back to global memory. Thus to avoid the latency of global memory, a good way to
compute data is to load it from global memory into shared memory, perform the computations
in shared memory, synchronize each thread block and then write the result back to the global
memory so that the host can read it when ready.
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B.3 Implementation options for the NTRUEncrypt
The target platform for our implementation is the NVIDIA GTX275 GPU installed on
the PCI Express 2.0 bus of a PC running AMD Athlon 64 X2 5000+ dual-core processor at 2.6
GHz and 2 GB of RAM. CUDA enables us to use the GTX275 GPU card, which runs at 1.404
GHz, as a parallel machine which contains 30 SMs, each contains 8 SPs with a total of 240
processing cores. The total memory of the card is 896 MB and each SM has a 16 KB shared
memory.
To utilize the advantages of the GPU, several plaintext messagesmi(x), i = 1, · · ·n, are
encrypted in parallel. The GPU receives the plaintext messages as a matrix M where the ith
row in M corresponds to the plaintext message mi(x). Similarly, the corresponding random
ephemeral keys are transferred to the GPU as a matrix R where the ith row represents the
random ephemeral key ri(x) used to encrypt the message mi(x). Finally, The GPU receives
the public key h(x) as a vector and compute the the ciphertext as a matrix C where the ith
row in C corresponds to the ciphertext ci(x). Depending on to the method used to present
the coefficients of ri(x), hi(x), mi(x) and ci(x), and the use of shared memory, we have the
following implementation choices:
• Representation of the polynomial r(x): the polynomial ri(x) can be represented in the
naı¨ve form as a polynomial with N coefficients or in the product form as shown in Equa-
tion (4.2).
• Representation of the polynomial coefficients: Traditionally, each coefficient of the poly-
nomials ri(x) and ci(x) is stored in one integer variable (normal coefficients representa-
tion). In order to reduce the memory copying time between the CPU and the GPU, we
employed a technique referred to as bit-packing [131] where each coefficient in ri(x) is
represented in 2-bits. Therefore, each ⌊32
2
⌋ = 16 coefficients can be represented in one
integer variable. Similarly, since q = 2048 = 211, ⌊32
11
⌋ = 2 coefficient in ci(x) can be
stored in one integer. This helps reduce the time required to copy the data from/to the
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GPU at the expense of the added computation time required to pack/un-pack the polyno-
mial coefficients before using them in the actual computations.
• Storage options: Data can be stored in global memory or in the shared memory. The
advantage of using shared memory over global memory is the low latency in calculation.
However, the size of the GPU shared memory is limited (16 KB for each SM of the GPU).
We assume that the key setup and the ephemeral keys generation are done off-line by
the host (i.e., the CPU). To encrypt n messages, each of size N elements, the convolution
multiplication between ri(x) and hi(x) is done first and then the plaintext messagesmi(x), i =
1 · · ·n are added (mod q) to the convolution output.
Figure B.3 illustrates the convolution operation using the Normal Polynomial form (NP),
the Normal Coefficients representation (NC) and the global memory as a storage. In Figure B.3,
theN ×nmatrix R corresponds to the n random ephemeral keys, each of sizeN elements. The
ith row of theN×N matrixH corresponds to a cyclically shifted version of the public key h(x)
by i elements. It should be noted that the matrixH shown in this Figure is a virtual matrix used
for illustration purpose only, i.e., it is not physically stored on the GPU or the CPU memory. In
other words, only h(x) is physically stored and the different rows of H are created by the way
that different threads use to access h(x) using different values for blockIdx.x and blockIdx.y as
shown in Algorithm 7. Each thread reads one row of the matrix R and one column of the matrix
H and then computes the ciphertext by adding the result of the convolution to the corresponding
element of the plaintext messagemi(x). One kernel is used to calculate the encryption operation
with 32 × 16 = 512 threads (to utilize the full capabilities of the SMs) which corresponds to
⌈N/32⌉ × ⌈n/16⌉ thread blocks.
As shown in Figure B.4, when the Bit-Packing approach (BP) is used to present the
coefficients of R and C, the size of the R matrix is reduced from n × N to n × ⌈N/16⌉.
Similarly, the size of the corresponding ciphertext matrix is reduced from n×N to n× ⌈N/2⌉.
Consequently, R can be transferred from the CPU to the GPU in a shorter time. Also copying
C from the GPU to the CPU will require less time.
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Algorithm 7 Pseudo code for naı¨ve implementation of NTRUEncrypt on GPU
1: INPUT: Plaintext matrixMn×N , random ephemeral key matrix Rn×N , the public key h1×N .
2: OUTPUT: The ciphertext matrix Cn×N
3: tx←− blockIdx.x ∗ blockDim.x+ threadIdx.x
4: ty ←− blockIdx.y ∗ blockDim.y + threadIdx.y
5: sum = 0
6: for i = 1 to N do
7: if (R[ty ∗N + i] = 1) then
8: sum←− sum+ h[(tx+N − i) mod N ]
9: else if (R[ty ∗N + i] = −1) then
10: sum←− sum− h[(tx+N − i) mod N ]
11: end if
12: end for











Figure B.3: The convolution operation using NP, NC, and GM
The computation efficiency on the GPU can be further improved when a thread block can
load a block of data into the on-chip shared memory, process it there, and then write the final
results back to external memory. Figure B.5 shows the case where the shared memory is used as
a storage when ri(x) is presented in the naı¨ve polynomial form and the normal representation is
used to encode the polynomial coefficients. Each thread block is responsible for computing one
block of the convolution matrix and each thread within the block is responsible for computing












Figure B.4: The convolution operation using NP, BP, and GM
one calculates the matrix H from the vector h(x) and then loads it into the shared memory.
The second kernel completes the encryption operation via the shared memory. It also performs
the necessary padding to ensure that the length of all blocks in R and H is divisible by 16.
The CUDA syncthreads() function is used to ensure that the data is copied to the shared
memory before performing any calculations on it. In the first kernel, 32 × 16 = 512 threads
and ⌈N/32⌉ × ⌈n/16⌉ blocks are used. The second kernel uses 16 × 16 = 256 threads and
⌈N/16⌉ × ⌈n/16⌉ blocks.
Figure B.6 shows the corresponding scenario where the bit-packing method is used to
represent the polynomial coefficients and the shared memory is used to store the matricesR and
H . Again, one kernel calculates the matrix H from the vector h(x) and then loads it into the
shared memory. The second kernel completes the encryption operation via the shared memory
with 16 × 16 = 256 threads and ⌈⌈N/2⌉/16⌉ × ⌈n/16⌉ blocks. The dimension of the matrix





























Figure B.5: The convolution operation using NP, NC, and SH
divided into blocks of size 16× 16 KB. The blocks in R and the corresponding blocks in H are
loaded into the shared memory. After performing the computation, the results are written into
the global memory.
Similar analysis applies when the Product Form (PF) is used except that the convolution
operation is performed three times per each encryption operation as shown in Equation (4.2).
As mentioned before, the key setup and the ephemeral keys generation are assumed to
be generated off-line by the host. Thus, the total encryption time is equal to the time required
to transfer the data from/to GPU and the time required to perform the necessary computational
operations inside the GPU. The use of shared memory requires a padding of h(x), mi(x), and
ri(x) in order to obtain a polynomial size dividable by the block size in the shared memory.
Since the decryption performs merely the same as encryption, we only illustrate the results for
encryption.
According to the discussion in the previous section, there are 23 = 8 combinations of
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Figure B.6: The convolution operation using NP, BP, and SH
encryption time required to encrypt n messages in parallel varies with n (i.e., as n messages are
loaded in one time from the host to the GPU and then encrypted in parallel on the GPU). Figure
B.8 shows the corresponding encryption throughput. Due to the limited memory of the GPU, the
maximum number of possible parallel operations is limited and varies depending on the memory
requirements associated with the eight different implementation choices. It is clear that the use
of product form, bit packing and shared memory allows us to achieve the best throughput where,
for example at n = 32768, the achieved number of parallel encryption operations per second
is 351,635. Since each message block has 1171 tuples and each tuple can assume the value
of +1,−1, 0, i.e., each tuple has 2 × 3
4
bits of information, then encrypting 351,635 message































Figure B.7: Total time required to encrypt n messages in parallel





























Figure B.8: The number of parallel encrypted messages per second.
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